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ARBITRABILITY IN RECENT FEDERAL CIVIL




With express judicial and congressional imprimatur, commercial
arbitration has entered the civil rights sphere.' In 1991, in Gilmer v.
Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp.,2 the Supreme Court held that a claim
under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA")3
can be subjected to compulsory arbitration pursuant to a predispute
arbitration agreement in a securities registration application.4 Gilmer
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Mlissouri-Columbia School of Law. BA. 1973,
Wesleyan University; J.D. 1976, Columbia University School of Law. I am grateful to several
of my colleagues for their comments on drafts of this Article: Robert G. Bailey. Peter N. Davis,
James R. Devine, William B. Fisch, Timothy J. Heinsz, Michael A. Middleton, Alfred S. Neely
IV, Walter E. Oberer and James E. Westbrook. My research was funded by the Lawence G.
Crahan and Linda S. Legg Faculty Research Fellowship at the University of Missouri School of
Law.
1. Federal arbitration law derives from three principal sources. "Commercial arbitration," this
Article's topic, is grounded in the first source, the Federal Arbitration Act of 1925 § 2. 9
U.S.C. § 2 (1988) ("FAA"). See generally MARTIN DOmE, DO.KE ON CO.tmERCIAL ARBrIRA-
"MON (Gabriel H. Wilner, ed., rev. ed. 1984 & Supp. 1992); IAN R. MACNEIL r AL.., FEDERAL
ARBITRATION LAw (1994). "Labor arbitration" which arises from provisions in collective-bar-
gaining agreements, is grounded in the second and third sources: (1) the Labor Management
Relations Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1988), and the federal common law which courts
fashion from the policy of the national labor laws; see Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills.
353 U.S. 448, 456 (1957). and (2) the Railway Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1988). which
governs arbitration in the railroad and airline industries. See generally FRANK ELKOURI & ED.A
ASPER ELKOURI How ARBrnRATION WORKS (4th ed. 1985 & Supp. 1935-89); ROBERT A.
GoRmAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, UNIONIZATION AND COILEcrIVE BARGAING 540-603
(1976).
2. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991), discussed infra text accompanying notes 140-58.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988).
4. The arbitration provision at issue in Gilmer appeared not in the plaintiff's employment
agreement with the defendant, but in an agreement between the plaintiff and the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE). The Court thus held that the exclusionary clause of § 1 of the FAA
did not apply to the agreement. 111 S. Ct. at 1651 n.2. Over the dissents of Justices Stevens
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was the fourth decision since 19855 in which the Supreme Court speci-
fied that, absent contrary congressional intent, arbitration agreements
covering claims under congressional statutes are enforceable in accor-
dance with section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA").6 None of
the previous three decisions, however, concerned the arbitrability of
claims under a civil rights statute.
By encouraging arbitration of disputes, the texts of the Americans
with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA") and the Civil Rights Act of
19918 express intent that section 2's mandate ("FAA mandate") operate
with respect to claims under any of the four statutes touched by the
Acts. 9 The ADA's text states that "arbitration ... is encouraged to
and Marshall, the majority declined to otherwise interpret the clause's scope. The clause pro-
vides that "nothing herein contained shall apply to contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C.
§ 1 (1988). In the lower courts, the dominant view is that the clause affects only workers di-
rectly involved in the interstate movement of objects. See Jeffrey W. Stempel, Reconsidering the
Employment Contract Exclusion in Section 1 of the Federal Arbitration Act: Correcting the
Judiciary's Failure of Statutory Vision, 1991 J. DIsp. RESOL. 259, 263, 279.
The bulk of reported individual employee arbitration disputes involve persons like plaintiff
Gilmer, who were employed by registered securities brokerage firms. The NYSE and various
other securities exchanges require employees of member firms to sign arbitration agreements
with the exchange covering disputes between themselves and their firms. Some non-securities
employers, however, also may include arbitration provisions in employment agreements with
their non-unionized employees. In this latter circumstance, this Article proceeds from the narrow
interpretation of § I of the FAA which has prevailed for the past several decades.
5. See also Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), over-
ruling Wilko v. Swan,.346 U.S. 427 (1953) (Securities Act of 1933 claims), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 131-33; Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220 (1987)
(claims under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and § 1964(c) of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act), discussed infra text accompanying notes 126-30;
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985) (Sherman Act
claims in international context), discussed infra text accompanying notes 111-25.
6. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988). Section 2's mandate covers both "predispute" and "post-dispute"
arbitration agreements:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of
such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof,
or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out
of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable,
save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any con-
tract.
See also id. § I (defining "maritime transaction" and "commerce").
7. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. IV 1992).
8. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (codified in various U.S.C. sections). The President
signed the Act on November 25, 1991, little more than six months after Gilmer's May 13 deci-
sion. See infra note 182 and accompanying text.
9. See infra text accompanying notes 166-67, 186.
[Vol. 26:521
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resolve disputes" under the Act' ° The 1991 Civil Rights Act is even
more ambitious in its reach. The text of this omnibus legislation states
that "arbitration... is encouraged to resolve disputes"" under four
statutes-the ADA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,'2 the
Civil Rights Act of 1866,13 and the ADEA. These textual statements
are significant because, before their expression, no congressional civil
rights statute had ever explicitly articulated intent that predispute arbi-
tration agreements be enforceable in accordance with the FAA.
This Article discusses the shortcomings inherent in the consideration
and enactment of the arbitrability provisions of the ADA and the 1991
Civil Rights Act. As a threshold matter, Part II demonstrates that the
latter Act's textual encouragement of arbitration indicates that Congress
misapprehended the effect of Gilmer, which the Supreme Court had
decided barely six months before the Act's passage. Specifically, this
Part will argue that after Gilmer, textual encouragement of arbitration
has little or no greater legal significance than textual silence would
have. In the few decades before the decision, textual encouragement
would have had significant impact because particular congressional stat-
utes usually did not explicitly address the FAA mandate's effect on
claims under the statute. Faced with congressional silence, courts fre-
quently held claims under various statutes inarbitrable due to the impor-
tance of the statute's underlying policy goals, the adequacy of arbitral
procedure, or the relative bargaining positions parties often occupy
when they execute arbitration agreements covering claims under the
statute. By disabling courts from weighing any of these three grounds
in determining the FAA mandate's effect, Gilmer effectively establishes
the arbitrability of claims under congressional statutes which are silent
concerning that effect. 4
Part III of this Article provides a history and explanation of the
arbitration provisions Congress wrote into the ADA and the 1991 Civil
Rights Act This Part discusses both the language of the Acts and the
congressional debates which preceded their enactment. When the dust
had settled, only the legislative histories of the Acts acknowledged limi-
10. 42 U.S.C. § 12212 (Supp. IV 1992). The ADA's arbitrability provision and the
provision's legislative history are discussed infra text accompanying notes 159-76.
11. Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1031 (1991). The 1991 Civil Rights Act's
arbitrability provision and the provision's legislative history are discussed infra text accompany-
ing notes 177-204.
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (1988).
13. Id § 1981.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 141-56.
19941
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tations on the binding effect arbitral awards would otherwise hold under
the FAA. If courts givd effect to the committee reports that accompa-
nied the 1990 and 1991 Acts, a claimant would be entitled to a post-
arbitral judicial trial de novo on claims under two of the four statutes
touched by the acts (the ADA and Title VII).'5
Part IV argues that Congress committed serious error by treating the
opportunity for post-arbitral trial de novo only in the legislative histo-
ries of the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act. The lawmakers have
invited the disquieting prospect that under rules of statutory interpreta-
tion, courts will enforce arbitration agreements under the FAA in accor-
dance with the textual directives without giving effect to the legislative
histories." In addition, the legislative histories recited a flawed ratio-
nale which would afford the opportunity on claims under only two of
the four affected statutes. 7
This Article concludes that Congress should amend the ADA and
the 1991 Civil Rights Act to grant claimants a right to a post-arbitral
trial de novo on claims under all four statutes touched by the acts.
Civil rights statutes hold a unique place in our jurisprudence as public
mandates to redress historic discrimination against particular classes or
groups of persons. The de novo trial right is necessary to help insure
that arbitral resolution of civil rights claims will be in accordance with
applicable law.'
15. See infra text accompanying notes 168-76, 188-204.
16. See infra text accompanying notes 235-47.
17. See infra text accompanying notes 168-76, 187-204, 248-58.
18. Congressional action should not await developments unrelated to the arbitrability provi-
sions of the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act. A natural opportunity for enacting the recom-
mended amendments, however, may nonetheless appear in the foreseeable future. In St. Mary's
Honor Center v. Hicks, 113 S. Ct. 2742 (1993), the Supreme Court held that in a suit against
an employer alleging intentional racial discrimination in violation of Title VII, the trier of fact's
rejection of the employer's asserted reasons for its actions does not mandate a finding for the
plaintiff. The 5-4 decision is expected to make proof of intentional discrimination more difficult
in a significant number of actions under Title VII (or the ADA, which adopts Title VII powers,
remedies, and procedures). Some commentators have urged Congress to overrule the decision, in
much the same manner as the 1991 Civil Rights Act overruled earlier Supreme Court decisions
which had rendered proof of discrimination more difficult. See, e.g., Of Lies, Bias and Justice,
STAR TRn., July 2, 1993, at 16A (Congress "has strived before to correct the Rehnquist Court's
niggling civil-rights rulings. It must strive again to right the court's wrongs."); Overburdened,
The Supreme Court Has Made It Too Difficult To Prove Bias: The Congress Must Act,
NEwSDAY, July 1, 1993, at 54; When Lying Pays, ST. LOUIS POST-DIsPATCH, June 29, 1993, at
2C; Wrong on Civil Rights, Again, SACRAMENTO BEE, June 29, 1993, at B6 (Hicks "added
what should quickly become another item to Congress' civil-rights agenda"); More Burdens
From the Rehnquist Court, N.Y. TiMES, June 27, 1993, § 4, at 14. Congressional consideration
of Hicks would provide an appropriate scenario for correcting the shortcomings inherent in the
[Vol. 26:521
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II. THE EFFECT OF CONGRESSIONAL SILENCE: FRoM VILKo TO
GLMER
A. Policy Decisions and Congressional Response
The primary impetus behind the FAA's 1925 enactment came from
the business and commercial community, which sought to assure judi-
cial enforcement of commercial arbitration agreements.' 9 Attention cen-
tered on predispute arbitration agreements, which were not specifically
enforceable at common law.? Before the FAA's enactment, only New
York and New Jersey had enacted statutes abrogating the common law
rule.2
Historically, the commercial arbitration model had been grounded in
contract-based claims rather than statutory claims. In the years immedi-
ately following the FAA's enactment, courts sporadically granted stays
pending FAA arbitration of claims under congressional statutes The
nascent act's effect on such claims, however, attracted relatively little
attention before the Supreme Court decided Wilko v. Swan in 1953?
For the first time, the Court determined the FAA mandate's effect on
arbitration agreements covering claims under a congressional statute.
1. Wilko
In a customer's suit against his broker, Wilko held that the parties'
arbitrability provisions of the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
19. See, eg., ABA Committee on Commerce. Trade and Commercial Law, The United States
Arbitration Law and Its Application, 11 A.B.A. J. 153. 153 (1925); Julius H. Cohen & Kenneth
Dayton. The New Federal Arbitration Law, 12 VA. L REV. 265, 265-66, 269-70 (1926); Sabra
A. Jones, Historical Development of Commercial Arbitration in the United States, 12 ,"mf. L
REv. 240, 249-50 (1928). See also, eg., Gilmer, I11 S. Ct. at 1659 (Stevens, J, disenting).
20. See, e.g., Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 n.4 (1974); Red Cross
Line v. Atlantic Fruit Co., 264 U.S. 109, 120-22 (1924) (discussing common law doctrine);
Kulukundis Shipping Co. v. Amtorg Trading Corp., 126 F2d 978. 982-85 (2d Cir. 1942)
(same); Hurst v. 1Itchfield, 39 N.Y. 377, 379 (1868) (same). See also, e.g., Wesley A. Sturges
& Irving 0. Murphy, Some Confusing Matters Relating to Arbitration Under the United States
Arbitration Act, 17 LAw & COmMMr .PROBS. 580, 581-82 & n.2 (1952) (sanm).
21. See Jones, supra note 19, at 249 (citing statutes); Sidney P. Simpson. Specific En-
forcement of Arbitration Contracts, 83 U. PA. L REv. 160, 165-69 & n.78 (1934) (same).
22. See, e.g., Evans v. Hudson Coal Co., 165 F.2d 970, 973 (3d Cir. 1948) (Fair Labor
Standards Act claims); Donahue v. Susquehanna Collieries Co., 160 F.2d 661. 664 (3d Cir.
1947) (same); Watkins v. Hudson Coal Co., 151 F.2d 311, 319-21 (3d Cir. 1945) (same). cert.
denied, 327 U.S. 777 (1946); Agostini Bros. Bldg. Corp. v. United States er rel. Virginia-Caro-
lina Elec. Works, Inc., 142 F.2d 854, 855 (4th Cir. 1944) (Miller Act claims).
23. 346 U.S. 427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shmaroan/An. Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477 (1989).
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predispute arbitration agreements were unenforceable with respect to
claims under section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 ("1933
Act").24  The dispositive issue concerned interpretation of the
antiwaiver provision in section 14 of the 1933 Act: "Any condition,
stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring any security to
waive compliance with any provision of [the 1933 Act] ... shall be
void."
Neither section 14 nor any other 1933 Act provision explicitly
addressed arbitrability, and the Act's legislative history was also silent
on the matter. In Wilko, the Supreme Court held that the parties' arbi-
tration agreements were "stipulations" which purported to "waive com-
pliance with" section 22(a) of the 1933 Act.26 Section 22(a) conferred
concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over claims under the Act. 2
Wilko fell short of ascertaining congressional intent concerning the
opaque section 14's effect on the FAA mandate. The Court first ex-
plored the respective purposes of the FAA and the 1933 Act, conclud-
ing that the FAA was designed to provide an "alternative to the com-
plications of litigation" 28 and that the 1933 Act was designed to pro-
tect securities investors.29 From this dual conclusion, the Court deter-
mined only that Congress "must have intended" section 14 to preclude
enforcement of the predispute arbitration agreements. 0 The Court's
rationale, developed in a hostile critique of commercial arbitration, was
that the protections the 1933 Act accorded investors were "lessened in
arbitration as compared to judicial proceedings."3 t
24. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1988). According to Wilko's majority, the question was whether "an
agreement to arbitrate a future controversy" ran afoul of the 1933 Act's antiwaiver provision.
346 U.S. at 430. In concurrence. Justice Robert H. Jackson stated that after the dispute arose,
the parties could have agreed to arbitration. Id at 438 (Jackson, J., concurring). Lower courts
embraced the Jackson concurrence, uniformly concluding that Wilko did not apply to agreements
to arbitrate existing disputes. See infra note 207.
25. 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1988).
26. 346 U.S. at 434-35, 432-33 & n.16.
27. See 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1988).
28. 346 U.S. at 431.
29. Id
30. I at 437.
31. Id at 435. The Court explained:
This case requires subjective findings on the purpose and knowledge of an alleged
violator of the [1933] Act. They must be not only determined but applied by the
arbitrators without judicial instruction on the law. As their award may be made with-
out explanation of their reasons and without a complete record of their proceedings,
the arbitrators' conception of the legal meaning of such statutory requirements as
"burden of proof," "reasonable care" or "material fact" . . . cannot be examined.
[V/ol. 26:521
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2. The American Safety Doctrine
Wilko's impact remained confined for more than a decade. Begin-
ning in the late 1960s, however, numerous lower courts took the
decision's open hostility toward commercial arbitration as authority to
weigh policy considerations and create exceptions to the FAA mandate
for claims under a number of congressional statutes whose texts and
legislative histories remained silent concerning the mandate's effect. As
the policy decisions appeared, Congress abandoned its traditional silence
and explicitly approved the arbitrability of claims under various statutes.
The policy approach's leading decision arose in the antitrust arena.
In American Safety Equipment Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co. in 1968,n
licensee American Safety sued Hickok Manufacturing Co., its licensor,
and Maguire, the claimed assignee of Hickok's royalty rights under the
license agreement. American Safety alleged that the agreement violated
Power to vacate an award is limited.
Id. at 435-36 (footnotes omitted). See also. eg., Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198,
203 (1956) (reiterating Wilko's critique). Cf. Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc.,
490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989) (discussing and rejecting Wilko's "hostility" to arbitration) (citation
omitted); Mclahon v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 482 U.S. 220, 233 (1987) (discussing and
rejecting "the mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis of... Wilko"). Rodriguez and
McMahon are discussed infra text accompanying notes 126-40.
Like the 1933 Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 did not explicitly address
arbitrability. Virtually all circuits extended Wilko to preclude predispute waiver of a judicial
forum for resolution of claims under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1938),
and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule lOb-5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993). See. e.g.,
Sterne v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 808 F.2d 480, 482-83 (6th Cir. 1987) (citing decisions):
Conover v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 794 F.2d 520. 521-27 (9th Cir. 1986), vacated and
remanded, 482 U.S. 923 (1987) (same), rev'd on remand, 837 F.2d 867 (9th Cir. 1988). Only
the First and Eighth circuits reached the contrary conclusion. See Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten,
Estabrook & Weeden, Inc., 806 F.2d 291, 295-98 & nn.4-5 (1st Cir. 1986); Phillips v. Merill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 795 F.2d 1393, 1399 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482
U.S. 931 (1987). The majority decisions' rationale was that the 1933 and 1934 acts shared
similar relevant statutory language and functionally indistinguishable investor-protection purpose
See infra notes 128-33 and accompanying text
Most decisions held that Wiko did not preclude enforcement of arbitration agreements
which covered 1933 Act or 1934 Act claims against securities exchange memabrs, or against
municipal securities dealers or municipal securities brokers. These decisions conclud:d that §
28(b) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(b) (1988), created an exception to the 1933 and 1934
Acts' antiwaiver provisions. See, e-g., Halliburton & Assocs. v. Henderson, Few & Co., 774
F.2d 441, 444-45 (11th Cir. 1985) (dispute between municipal securities dealers; discussing
precedent). But see, eg., Allegaert v. Perot 548 F.2d 432, 437 (2d Cir.) (refusing to apply this
exception in suit involving bankruptcy truste's claim of "wholesale fraud of institutional dimen-
sion"; held that trustee's claim raised broad policy questions that should be resolved by courts
rather than arbitrators), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977).
32. 391 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
19941
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the Sherman Act by unlawfully extending Hickok's trademark monopoly
and by unreasonably restricting American Safety's business. Maguire
invoked the agreement's arbitration clause and demanded arbitration of
a claim to past due royalties of approximately $321,000. 33
The Second Circuit reversed orders which had stayed judicial pro-
ceedings pending arbitration of the Sherman Act claims. When the court
of appeals articulated the dispositive question, it took the unusual step
of citing its own Wilko decision, which the Supreme Court had re-
versedY34 The question, according to the Wilko and American Safety
judges, was whether the statutory right at issue was "'of a character
inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration."'3 5
Citing the Supreme Court's Wilko decision, American Safety held
that FAA enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements covering
Sherman Act claims was inappropriate on three grounds.36 The
grounds corresponded to the ones Gilmer would remove from the judi-
cial calculus twenty-three years later.37
American Safety's first ground for non-enforcement concerned the
importance of the Sherman Act's underlying policy goals. The Second
Circuit stated that "[a] claim under the antitrust laws is not merely a
private matter," but rather serves to "promote the national interest in a
competitive economy," with non-government plaintiffs acting as private
attorneys general.38 The court of appeals reasoned that some Sherman
Act claims might implicate massive misconduct which would have a
significant impact on the public interest: "Antitrust violations can affect
hundreds of thousands-perhaps millions--of people and inflict stagger-
ing economic damage." 39 The court concluded that such occasional
substantial claims warranted removal from the FAA mandate of all
predispute agreements covering claims under the Act.
American Safety's second ground concerned the adequacy of arbitral
procedure. The Second Circuit concluded that "the issues in antitrust
cases are prone to be complicated, and the evidence extensive and
33. Id. at 822-23.
34. l at 824; see also Wilko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439. 444 (2d Cir.), rev'd, 346 U.S. 427
(1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
35. 391 F.2d at 825 (quoting 201 F.2d at 444).
36. 391 F.2d at 826. The court of appeals reserved decision on the enforceability of agree-
ments to arbitrate existing Sherman Act disputes. Id. at 827-28. Concerning judicial treatment of
predispute and post-dispute arbitration agreements generally, see infra note 207.
37. See supra text accompanying note 14, infra text accompanying notes 141-56.
38. 391 F.2d at 826.
39. l
[Vol. 26:521
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diverse, far better suited to judicial than to arbitration procedures.'" In
addition, the court of appeals raised the specter that arbitrators would
be biased in favor of business interests named as antitrust defendants.
The court concluded that "it hardly seems proper" to vest arbitrators
drawn from the business community with authority to determine anti-
trust claims whose magnitude might implicate the public interest.4'
American Safety's third ground concerned the relative bargaining
positions parties often occupy when they execute arbitration agreements
covering Sherman Act claims. The panel found it "proper to ask' whet-
her an antitrust claim's forum should be determined by "contracts of
adhesion between alleged monopolists and their customers., 42 The pan-
el concluded that "Congress would hardly have intended that."'43
Before the Supreme Court upheld the arbitrability of Sherman Act
claims in an international context in 1985, American Safety's holding
had been adopted by every other court of appeals that had reached the
issue of Sherman Act arbitrability.45 Indeed, the Second Circuit itself
had reaffirmed American Safety's Sherman Act holding on numerous
occasions. 6 But the holding also had left a considerably wider mark.




44. See Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth. Inc, 473 U.S. 614 (1935), dis-
cussed infra text accompanying notes 111-25.
45. See Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 620-21. See also, eg., Lake Communications, Im v. ICC
Corp., 738 F.2d 1473, 1479 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing decisions); Lee v. PlyeGcm Indus.. Inc., 593
F.2d 1266, 1274-75 & n.67 (D.C. Cir.) (same). cert denied, 441 U.S. 967 (1979). Cf. In re
Arbitration between Aimcee Wholesale Corp. and Tomar Prods., Inc. 237 N.E.2d 223 (N.Y.
1968) (claims under N.Y. state antitrust law not arbitrable).
46. See, e.g., NPS Communications, Inc. v. Continental Group, Inc., 760 F.2d 463, 466 (2d
Cir. 1985); Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp., 6S4 F.2d 228. 231 (2d Cir. 19S2);
Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Societe Generale de L'Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d
969, 975 (2d Cir. 1974); Bradford v. New York Times Co., 501 F.2d 51, 61 (2d Cir. 1974);
Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1215 (2d Cir.). cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949
(1972). See also, e.g, Allegaert v. Perot. 548 F.2d 432, 436 (2d Cir.) (refusing to compel the
bankruptcy trustee, pursuant to predispute agreements, to arbitrate his claims under the former
bankruptcy act arising from an alleged scheme to defraud the bankrupt; reiterating that under
American Safety, a statutory claim's appropriateness for arbitration under the FAA mandate
depended on "the public interest in the dispute, the degree to which the nature of the evidence
made the judicial forum preferable to arbitration and the extent to which the agreement to arbi-
trate was a product of free choice"), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977). In the few years before
the Supreme Court articulated the congressional intent standard that now prevails, several lower
courts took A/Lgaert to preclude FAA enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements covering
claims by bankruptcy trustees. See e.g., Dickinson v. Heinold Sees., Inc.. 661 F.2d 638. 644
n.11 (7th Cir. 1981); Corcoran v. ShearsonlAm. Express Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1113, 1115 (N.D.
1994]
HeinOnline  -- 26 Conn. L. Rev. 529 1993-1994
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
By mid-decade, numerous lower courts had applied American Safety's
rationale in decisions under the patent laws,47 the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), s the Commodity Ex-
change Act ("CEA"), 49 and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Or-
Ga. 1984); Hagstrom v. Breutman, 572 F. Supp. 692, 699-700 (N.D. 11. 1983); Breyer v. First
Nat'l Monetary Corp., 548 F. Supp. 955, 959 (D. NJ. 1982).
47. See Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Indus., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 1057, 1061-62 & nn.9-
13 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), appeal dismissed, 516 F.2d 975 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 913
(1975). See also, e.g., N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 532
F.2d 874, 876 (2d Cir. 1976) (claims relating to validity of United States patents not arbitrable);
Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 63 (7th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 976 (1971) (patent validity claims not arbitrable); Foster Wheeler Corp. v.
Babcock & Wilcox Co., 440 F. Supp. 897, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (patent validity or infringement
claims not arbitrable). But cf Kamakazi Music Corp., 684 F.2d at 231 (in absence of precedent
concerning arbitrability of copyright claims, held that arbitrator may decide claim for infringe-
ment of a copyright whose validity had already been judicially determined).
The patent law holdings had scattered roots predating American Safety. See, e.g., Leesona
Corp. v. Cotwool Mfg. Corp., 204 F. Supp. 141, 143 (W.D.S.C. 1962) (arbitration of patent
infringement claims stayed until conclusion of related lawsuit; dictum stated that such claims
were "inherently unsuited" to arbitration), aff'd on other grounds, 315 F.2d 538, 542 (4th Cir.
1963) ("If after [the lawsuit, plaintiff] still desires arbitration, it remains available."); Zip Mfg.
Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co., 44 F.2d 184, 185-86 (D. Del. 1930) (held that claims relating to patent
validity or infringement did not involve commerce and thus were not within the FAA mandate,
dictum stated that such claims were "inherently unsuited" to arbitration).
Congress has overruled the holdings that had created exceptions to the FAA mandate for
patent validity or infringement claims. See infra text accompanying notes 78-86.
48. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988). See Lewis v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 431 F. Supp. 271, 276-77 (E.D. Pa. 1977). Contra Fox v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 453 F.
Supp. 561, 565-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1978) (arbitrator may decide ERISA claim to enforce rights under
terms of employee benefit plan). The Supreme Court has not decided the question whether
ERISA claims are within the FAA mandate. Recent lower court authority answers in the affir-
mative. See, e.g., Pritzker v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 7 F.3d 1110 (3d Cir,
1993); Bird v. Shearson Lehman/Am. Express, Inc., 871 F.2d 292 (2d Cir.) (Congress intended
to preclude waiver of judicial remedies for statutory ERISA claims, but not for contractual
claims involving ERISA-covered plans), vacated, 493 U.S. 884 (1989), remanded, 926 F.2d 116
(2d Cir.) (Congress did not intend to preclude waiver of judicial forum for claims arising under
ERISA), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2891 (1991); Weston v. IT-CFC, No. 3:92-CV-2045-H, 1992
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21200 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 3, 1992); Fabian Fin. Servs. v. Kurt H. Volk, Inc.,
Profit Sharing Plan, 768 F. Supp. 718, 730-34 (C.D. Cal. 1991).
49. 7 U.S.C. §§ 1-26 (1988). In the Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974,
Congress authorized arbitration of CEA claims below enumerated ceiling amounts by customers
against commodities professionals. The Futures Trading Act of 1982 removed the ceilings. See
infra text accompanying notes 64-71.
In actions brought before the 1982 Act's effective date, several lower courts invoked Amer-
ican Safety and precluded arbitration of CEA claims whose requested recovery exceeded the
ceilings. See, e.g., Breyer, 548 F. Supp. at 959-61; Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. French, 425 F.
Supp. 1231, 1232-34 (D.D.C. 1977); Milani v. ContiCommodity Servs., Inc., 462 F. Supp. 405,
406-07 (N.D. Cal. 1976). But see, e.g., Smoky Greenhaw Cotton Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce,
Fenner & Smith, Inc., 720 F.2d 1446, 1449 (5th Cir. 1983) (refusing to create an exception to
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ganizations Act ("RICO").50 Faced with congressional silence concern-
ing the FAA mandate's effect on claims under these statutes, the lower
courts cited American Safety and held arbitration agreements unenforce-
able based on considerations relating to policy importance,5' procedural
adequacy,5' or relative bargaining position Some lower courts even
went so far as to identify a judicially created "protective legislation
exception" to the mandate
the FAA mandate for CEA claims because the exception "would require a judicial policy deci-
sion that Congress has not made"); Ingbar v. Drexel Burnham Lanbert Inc., 633 F.2d 603, 604-
06 (Ist Cir. 1982) (refusing to create exception to FAA mandate for CEA claims); Romnes v.
Bache & Co., 439 F. Supp. 833, 838 (W.D. Wis. 1977) ("no national policy reason exists for
precluding arbitration" of CEA claims).
50. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). See, e.g.. Weizman v. Adomato. 625
F. Supp. 1101, 1102 (E.D.N.Y. 1985); McMahon v. ShearsonAm. Express. Inc., 618 F. Supp.
384, 387 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), affd in part and rev'd in part, 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986). rev'd
on this ground, 482 U.S. 220 (1987); Witt v. Merrill Lynch. Pierc Fenner & Smith, In- 602
F. Supp. 867, 870 (W.D. Pa. 1985); Universal Marine Ins. Co. v. Becon Ins. Co., 588 F.
Supp. 735, 738 (W.D.N.C. 1984); Wilcox v. Ho-Wing Sit. 586 F. Supp. 561, 567 (N.D. Cal.
1984); S.A. Mlneracao da Trinidade-Samitri v. Utah Int'i Inc., 576 F. Supp. 566. 575 (S.D.N.Y.
1983), amended; 579 F. Sup . 1049 (S.D.N.Y.), affd. 745 F.2d 190 (2d Cir. 1984).
51. See, e.g., Weibman, 625 F. Supp. at 1102 (citing S.A. Mineracao da Trinldade.Samitn);
Universal Marine Ins. Co., 588 F. Supp. at 738 (same); Wilcox, 586 F. Supp. at 567 (same);
S.A. Mineracao da Trinidade-Samitri, 576 F. Supp. at 574 (discussing "the general public inter-
est in the enforcement of RICO"); Breyer, 548 F. Supp. at 959 ("the arbitral forum is not ,d.=-
quate to effectuate the policies underlying protective legislation"); French. 425 F. Supp. at 1234
("a public forum [is] the means best calculated for resolving private disputes [under thz Com-
modity Exchange Act] in a manner that protects the marketplace"); Dlematlic Mfg. Corp., 381 F.
Supp. at 1061 ("the grave public interest in [patent and infringement] questions ... rende
them inappropriate for determination in arbitration proceedings"). See also, eg. N.V.
MaatschappU Voor Industriele Waarden, 532 F.2d at 876 (citing Dleratlc); Beckman Instru-
ments, Inc., 433 F.2d at 63 (patent validity claims require court to make decisions "crucial not
only to the parties involved, but of vital importance to the public generally") (citation omitted);
Foster Wheeler Corp., 440 F. Supp. at 901 (citing Diematic).
52. See, eg., Breyer, 548 F. Supp. at 961 (discussing "[t]he shortcomings of the arbitral
forum compared to a judicial forum"); Milani, 462 F. Supp. at 407 ("Judicial direction, at the
trial level, is essential to assure that [the Commodity Exchange Act] is properly applied"): Lew-
is, 431 F. Supp. at 275 (citing and quoting Wilko critique).
53. See, e.g., Breyer, 548 F. Supp. at 959 (discussing the "inferior bargaining position" of
commodities investors) (citation omitted); Lewis, 431 F. Supp. at 275 (discussing the "superior
bargaining position" of pension plan sponsors and administrators).
54. See, e.g., Corcoran v. Shearson/Am. Express Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1113, 1115 (N.D. Ga.
1984); Hagstrom v. Breutman, 572 F. Supp. 692, 699 (N.D. IlL 1983); Breyer. 548 F. Supp. at
959; Lewis, 431 F. Supp. at 277. See also French, 425 F. Supp. at 1233 (discussing "judicial
exception[s]" to FAA).
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3. Congressional Response to the American Safety Doctrine
When Congress created a private right of action before the early
1970s, the lawmakers ordinarily did not explicitly address the FAA
mandate's effect on claims asserting the right.55 From Wilko to Gilmer,
absence of explicit congressional definition was the foundation of every
Supreme Court decision that determined the mandate's effect on private
rights Congress had created before the close of the 1960s. 56
Shortly after American Safety, however, Congress began to depart
from tradition and to explicitly approve the arbitrability of claims under
various statutes. It is difficult to say with certainty what motivated this
55. Because a later particular statute controls over an earlier general one on the same sub-
ject, see 2B J.B. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.02, at 121 (5th
ed. 1992 rev. by Norman J. Singer), Congress retained authority to define the mandate's effect
each time it created a private right likely to be the subject of arbitration agreements.
At least in some part, Congress's traditional silence may have been a product of timing. In
the FAA's earliest years, drafters may not even have fully recognized the mandate's amenability
to claims under congressional statutes. See, e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S.
Ct. 1647, 1661 (1991) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("When the FAA was passed in 1925, I doubt
that any legislator who voted for it expected it to apply to statutory claims . . . ."); Mitsubishi
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 646-47 & n.11 (1985) (Stevens,
J., dissenting). In later years, Congress occasionally authorized private consensual arbitration of
disputes which raised contract-based claims. Statutes would explicitly provide for arbitration by
an administrative agency, but with arbitral awards becoming final only on the agency's approval.
See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 671 (1988) (authorizing arbitration, on consent of all parties, by Secretary
of Agriculture or a designee of bona fide disputes concerning the terms and conditions of the
sale of milk or its products between a producer cooperative and purchasers, handlers, processors
or distributors; arbitral award not effective until approved by the Secretary or designee); 41
U.S.C. § 113(0 (1988) (war contractor and subcontractor may agree to submit dispute to a con-
tracting agency for arbitration when authorized by the agency; arbitral award is conclusive as to
the parties and shall not be questioned by the United States except for fraud or collusion). In
1953, Wilko addressed the FAA mandate's amenability to statutory claims. 346 U.S. at 431-32
("practice under [the FAA's] terms raises hope for its usefulness ... in controversies based on
statutes").
56. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991) (ADEA claims),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 140-55; Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express,
Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989), overruling Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (1933 Act claims),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 131-33; Shearson/Am. Express, Inc. v. McMahon, 482
U.S. 220 (1987) (claims under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 or the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 126-30; Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth. Inc., 473 U.S.
614 (1985) (Sherman Act claims in international context), discussed infra text accompanying
notes 109-21; Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) (claims under § 10(b) of
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule lOb-5 in international context), discussed infra text
accompanying notes 94-104; Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 427 (1953) (1933 Act claims), overruled
by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477 (1989) (1933 Act claims),
discussed supra text accompanying notes 23-31.
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change in approach. After all, reading lawmakers' minds is no easier
than reading anyone else's. Still, it seems plausible that Congress recog-
nized that its silence invited courts to apply the increasingly expansive
American Safety doctrine and to hold various statutory causes
inarbitrable. The explicit approvals of arbitration, then, would be at-
tempts to preclude such holdings?7
Two overarching themes emerge from the explicit congressional
approvals. First, where the lawmakers intended to approve the FAA's
operation without qualification, the statutory texts used only the words
"arbitration" or "binding arbitration," without naming the seminal act or
tracking its language. Second, Congress accompanied the explicit ap-
provals with recurrent praise for arbitration as a dispute resolution
method marked by fair procedure58
a. Approving the FAA's Operation
Beginning in the early 1970s, several acts reflected Congress' new
determination to provide explicitly for arbitration in the statutory text.
The subjects of these acts ranged from environmental protection to
business law to intellectual property.
For example, five years after American Safety, the Trans-Alaska
Pipeline Authorization Act of 197359 sought to protect the environment
from risks created by the Pipeline, and to protect persons suffering
injury related to these risks.60 Among other things, the Act imposed
civil liability on holders of oil pipeline rights-of-way along the Trans-
Alaska Pipeline System. 1 Private parties could recover for damages
suffered in connection with or resulting from the holder's activities
along the right-of-way or in its vicinity.' The Act specified that dam-
57. Congress remained silent concerning arbitrability when it enacted RICO in 1970, two
years after American Safety. See McMahan, 482 U.S. at 238. Extrapolating from a silent legisla-
tive record carries inherent risk, but the most plausible explanation for RICO's silence is that
arbitrability never occurred to any lawmaker who considered the statute's co-atIment. Th law-
makers did not expect RICO's private remedy to enjoy the general applicability it has enjoyed
since the early 1980s. Congress expected private RICO suits to be directed at organizd-crime
and racketeer defendants, who would not ordinarily be parties to arbitration agreements. See
infra note 145.
58. Both themes are reflected in the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act. See infra text cc-
companying notes 166-68, 183-86.
59. Pub. L No. 93-153. tit. H, 87 Stat. 576. 584 (codified at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1655 (1988
& Supp. IV 1992)).
60. See Heppner v. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co.. 665 F.2d 863. 873 (9th Cir. 1981).
61. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(a) (1988).
62. Id § 1653(a)(1). The holder's liability was in proportion to its ownership interest in the
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age claims "may be determined by arbitration or judicial proceed-
ings.
' 63
The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act of 197464 was
similarly explicit in its approval of arbitration. This Act required each
board of trade designated as a commodities contract market to "provide
a fair and equitable procedure through arbitration or otherwise for the
settlement of customers' claims and grievances against any member or
employee thereof."' The Act also authorized the newly created Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") to register an association
as a futures association where, among other things, the association's
rules provided for such an arbitration procedure. 66 The Act, however,
created ceilings that limited the procedure's application to claims not
exceeding $15,000 in the case of contract markets,67 and to claims not
exceeding $5,000 in the case of futures associations. 6 The Futures
Trading Act of 198269 removed the ceilings7° and clarified that com-
right-of-way. Id § 1653(a)(2). Holders were strictly liable for a maximum of 50 million dollars
in damages for any one incident, id. § 1653(a)(1), (2), but a holder had a complete defense
where it proved the damage was caused by the negligence of the United States or other govern-
ment entity, or of the injured party. Id. § 1653(a)(1). Liability for damages exceeding 50 mil-
lion dollars would be determined in accordance with ordinary rules of negligence. Id. §
1653(a)(2). In 1990 Congress raised the strict liability limit to 350 million dollars. Oil Pollution
Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, § 8101(b), 104 Stat. 484, 565 (1990) (codified at 43 U.S.C.
§ 1653(a)(1) (Supp. IV 1992)).
63. 43 U.S.C. § 1653(a)(I) (1988). In 1990 Congress amended the Act but left the earlier
specification untouched. Id. § 1001-20, 104 Stat, at 486-506.
64. Pub. L. No. 93-463, 88 Stat. 1389 (1974) (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.).
65. § 209, 88 Stat. at 1401 (adding § 5a(ll) of the Commodity Exchange Act, codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 7a(ll) (1988)). See also 7 U.S.C. § 7a(ll) (defining "customer"); Id. §
7 (governing designation of board of trade as "contract market"). See generally M. Van Smith,
Breaking the Chains that Bind: Arbitration Agreements Versus Forum Rights Under the Com-
modity Futures Trading Commission Act of 1974, 16 SAN DIEGO L. RBv. 749, 753-61 (1979)
(discussing commodities arbitration before CFTC Act).
66. § 301, 88 Stat. at 1406-11 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1988)). with re-
spect to both contracts markets and futures associations, the Act provided that the procedure's
use by a customer must be voluntary. 7 U.S.C. § 7a(1l)(i) (contracts markets); id. § 21(b)(10)(i)
(futures associations).
67. § 209, 88 Stat. at 1401 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 7a(ll) (1988)).
68. § 301, 88 Stat, at 1406-11 (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. § 21(b) (1988)). The Fu-
tures Trading Act of 1978 raised the $5,000 ceiling to $15,000. Pub. L. No. 95405, § 22(2),
92 Stat. 865, 876 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 5 & 7 U.S.C.).
69. Pub. L. No. 97-444, 96 Stat. 2294 (codified in scattered sections of 7 U.S.C.). See also
H.R. RFP. No. 565, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 56 (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3871, 3905 (Act sought to "enhance the attractiveness of arbitration" of commodities disputes);
128 CONG REc. H7483 (1982) (remarks of Rep. de la Garza) (bill would "make arbitration
more attractive and effective"); id at H7487 (remarks of Rep. Wampler) (bill would "provide
for broadened power for individuals to request arbitration"); id. at S14,816 (remarks of Sen.
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modities customers may bind themselves by predispute arbitration agree-
ments71
The Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 19847' created a sui
generis intellectual property right similar in many respects to existing
copyright law. 3 A "semiconductor chip" is a multi-layer product of
metal, semiconductor or insulating material on a semi-conductor sub-
strate; the product is intended to perform electronic circuitry func-
tions.74 The Act provides that where an innocent purchaser resells a
fluddleston) (bill "broadens the right of individuals to request arbitration of claims against com-
modity brokers"). The Act broadened the definitions of "customer" in the provisions relating to
contracts markets and futures associations. See Pub. L No. 97-444, § 217(a), 96 Stat. 2294.
2307 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 7a(11) (1988)) (contract markets); Pub. L No. 97-444. § 217(b).
96 Stat. 2294, 2307 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 21(b)(10) (1988)) (futures associations). See gener-
ally HR. REP. No. 565, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 56 (1982), reprinted in 1932
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3871, 3941 (explaining the breadth of the amended definitions).
70. § 217, 96 Stat. at 2307. See HR. REP. No. 565, 97th Cong., 2d Sess, pt. 1. at 56
(1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N 3871, 3905. The lawmakers rejected a more modest
General Accounting Office proposal to raise the arbitral ceilings to S25,000. and to authorize the
CFrC to raise the ceilings to $50,000 to reflect future Consumer Price Index changes. HR.
REP. No. 565, 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 56 (1982) reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N 3871,
3992. Between 1974 and 1982, lower courts had disagreed concerning the enforceability of
arbitration agreements with respect to CEA claims that exceeded the ceilings. See supra note 49.
71. The 1982 Act created an express private right of action for recovery of actual damages
against violators of the CFTC Act; the right specifically did not "limit or abridge the rights of
the parties to agree in advance of a dispute upon any forum for resolving claim .... includ-
ing arbitration." Pub. L No. 97-444. § 235, 96 Stat. 2294. 2322-23 (codified at 7 U.S.C. § 25
(1988)). See 17 C.F.R. § 180.3 (1993) (CFrC rules concerning enforceability of predispute
arbitration agreements). A few months before enactment of the 1982 Act. the Supreme Court
had held that an implied private right of action existed for damages caused by CEA violations.
See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran. 456 U.S. 353. 374-95 (1932). Be-
fore this decision, lower courts had "routinely and consistently" recognized such an implied
right. L at 379.
Before the 1982 legislation CFrC regulations had provided for enforcement of predispute
arbitration agreements, subject to procedural safeguards specified in the regulations. See 17
C.F.R. § 180.3(b) (1981) (contract markets); id, § 170.8 (futures associations). See also 17
C.F.R. § 180.3 (1993) (contract markets); . § 170.8 (futures associations). The predispute
agreement may work a waiver of the right to sue in court, but does not work a vaiver of the
right to proceed under the CFrC reparations program if the customer elects to proceed unde
the program within forty-five days after a demand for arbitration is made Id. §§ 180.3(3). (6)
(contract markets); 170.8 (futures associations). The reparations program provides for CFEC ad-
judication of customer claims against commodity professionals and firms. See generally 1 PHI
MCBRIDE JOHNsON & THOMAS Lm HAzEN. Commn OrEs REGULA"ION § 2.45 (2d ed. 1939 &
Supp. 1991).
72. Pub. L No. 98-620, 98 Stat. 3347 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 901-914 (1988 & Supp. PV
1992)).
73. See HR. REP. No. 781, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1984). reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5708, 5765.
74. 17 U.S.C. § 901(a)(l) (1988) (definition section).
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unit of an infringing product (for example, as part of a machine it
manufactures and sells) before having notice that the Act protects the
product, the purchaser incurs no liability to the product's owner. 5
Where an innocent purchaser resells such a unit after having notice of
protection, however, the Act imposes liability on the purchaser for a
reasonable royalty on the unit.76 The Act provides for determination of
the royalty in a civil infringement action "unless the parties resolve the
issue by voluntary negotiation, mediation, or binding arbitration.""7
In 1982 Congress enacted 35 U.S.C. § 294,8 which approved the
arbitrability of patent validity or infringement claims, but with qualifica-
tions on the effect of arbitral awards.79 Tracking the FAA mandate's
language, § 294(a) provides that predispute and post-dispute arbitration
agreements are "valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except for any
grounds that exist at law or in equity for revocation of a contract. 80
Section 294(b) provides that the FAA governs the arbitral proceeding as
well as its award and confirmation.8" Section 294(c) specifies, howev-
er, that an award binds only the parties to the arbitration.
2
The Patent Law Amendments Act of 198483 paralleled the 1982
legislation by authorizing parties to a patent interference to arbitrate
their dispute or any aspect of it." The 1984 Act provides that the
FAA governs the arbitration. 5 Again, Congress qualified the effect of
arbitral awards. An award binds the parties but does not preclude the
75. Id. § 907(a)(1). See also id. § 901(7) (defining "innocent purchaser" as "a person who
purchases a semiconductor chip product in good faith and without having notice of protection
with respect to the semiconductor chip product").
76. Id. § 907(a)(2).
77. Id. § 907(b).
78. Pub. L. No. 97-242, § 17(b)(1), 96 Stat. 322 (1982).
79. Id. The section overruled decisions that, amid silence in the patent law's text and leg-
islative history, had created exceptions to the FAA mandate for such claims. See authorities
cited supra note 47.
80. 35 U.S.C. § 294(a) (1988). The FAA mandate, 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988), is quoted supra
note 6.
81. 35 U.S.C. § 294(b).
82. Id. § 294(c).
83. Pub. L. No. 98-622, 98 Stat. 3383.
84. § 105, 98 Stat. at 3385 (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 135(d) (1988)). See also 130 CONO.
REC. 28,071-73 (1984) (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier) (bill authorizing arbitration of interference
disputes "parallels" 1982 legislation authorizing arbitration of validity and infringement disputes);
U at 32,275 (remarks of Rep. Kastenmeier) (same).
85. 35 U.S.C. § 135(d).
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Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks from determining the patent-
ability of the invention involved in the interference. 6
b. Congressional Praise for Arbitral Fairness
Congress did more than simply express approval of arbitration as an
alternative to judicial resolution of disputes. In most cases, the lawmak-
ers accompanied their expressions with praise for the fairness of arbitral
resolution.
The 1974 commodities legislation directed the CFTC to police the
fairness and equity of commodities arbitration.' When the 1982 com-
modities legislation removed the eight-year-old ceilings, Congress con-
cluded that the agency's regulations had accomplished the mission:
"[A]rbitration is an equally viable forum for resolving customer claims
in excess of $15,000. ''88
Reporting favorably on the 1982 patent bill, the House Judiciary
Committee concluded that arbitration of validity and infringement dis-
putes "would benefit both the parties ... and the public ' s' because
parties "could avail themselves of the numerous advantages of arbitra-
tion without the possibility of having to reargue the dispute in
court.' ° In particular, the committee praised the speed and flexibility
of arbitration and the specialized knowledge of arbitrators." Congress
also based the 1984 patent interference legislation on this perception of
86. Id.
87. See supra text accompanying notes 64-65.
88. H.R. REP. No. 565. 97th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 56 (1982), reprinted in 1932
U.S.C.CA.N 3871, 3905.
89. H.R. REP. No. 542, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1982). reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 765.
777.
90. Id.
91. In the Committee's own words:
The advantages of arbitration are many: it is usually cheaper and faster than litiga-
tion; it can have simpler procedural and evidentiary rules: it normally miniizes
hostility and is less disruptive of ongoing and future business dealings among the
parties; it is often more flexible in regard to scheduling of times and places of hear-
ings and discovery devices; and, arbitrators are frequently better versed than judges
and juries in the area of trade customs and the technologies involved in te dis-
putes.
Id. The public interest would be served because arbitration would "enhance the patent system
and thus. . . encourage innovation," and "could relieve some of the burdeus on the overworked
Federal courts." Mot See also Statement on Signing the Patent and Trademark Ofice Appropria-
tions Bill, reprinted in PUB. PAPERS, Ronald Reagan 1982, pt. 11, at 1037 C"This bill authorize
voluntary arbitration of patent validity and infringement disputes. This will not only improve the
patent system and encourage innovation but will help relieve the burden on the Federal courts.")
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arbitral fairness.' The lawmakers accompanied the Semiconductor
Chip Protection Act with similar sentiment, stating that "alternatives to
litigation will work well here, ultimately achieving equitable results."'
B. The Decline of Policy Decisions
1. The Roots of the Decline: Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.
While Congress was beginning to make explicit its approval of
arbitration as an alternative to judicial resolution of claims under partic-
ular statutes, the Supreme Court was also moving toward explicit ap-
proval. In Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co.94 in 1974, the Court signaled a
departure from Wilko's evident hostility toward commercial arbitra-
tion.95
Pursuant to a predispute agreement with the American corporate
plaintiff, the German defendant Scherk sought to compel arbitration of
claims under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("1934 Act")96  and Securities and Exchange Commission Rule
92. See supra note 84.
93. H.R. REP. No. 781, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 23 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5750, 5772.
94. 417 U.S. 506 (1974).
95. Judicial attitudes toward commercial arbitration and labor arbitration have not developed
along parallel paths. The Supreme Court has long recognized that the Railway Labor Act of
1926 ("RLA") seeks to "encourag[e] the amicable adjustment of labor disputes by their volun-
tary submission to arbitration ...." Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed'n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515,
542-43 (1937). See also, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Toledo, Peoria & W. R.R., 321
U.S. 50, 58 (1944); Texas & New Orleans R.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Ry. & Steamship
Clerks, 281 U.S. 548, 567 (1930). When the federal courts' commercial arbitration jurisprudence
was generally marked by Wilko's evident hostility, the Court also lauded arbitration under the
Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 ("LMRA"). See, e.g., Textile Workers Union v. Lin-
coln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957).
Typical of the Court's Wilko-era approach to labor arbitration was United Steelworkers v.
Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960). Warrior & Gulf concerned a labor
union's suit under § 301(a) of the LMRA to compel arbitration pursuant to a collective-bargain-
ing agreement. The Court held Wilko and other commercial arbitration decisions "irrelevant" to
the suit's disposition: "In the commercial case, arbitration is the substitute for litigation. Hero
arbitration is the substitute for industrial strife." Id. at 578.
The Court's approach to labor arbitration reflected express congressional approval of arbi-
tral resolution of disputes arising from collective-bargaining agreements. See RLA, 45 U.S.C. §§
151, 151a (1988); LMRA §§ 201(b), 203(d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 171(b), 173(d) (1988). See also, e.g.,
AT & T Tech., .Inc. v. Communications Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 648 (1986) (discussing "reli.
ance on arbitration . . . as the preferred method of resolving disputes arising during the term of
a collective-bargaining agreement").
96. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
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lOb-5.7 The Court assumed, without deciding, that the 1934 Act's
antiwaiver and other operative provisions were sufficiently similar to
their 1933 Act counterparts to invite a Wilko-type holding precluding
enforcement of the agreement's arbitration provision. 3
Nonetheless, Scherk upheld the FAA mandate's enforcement because
the parties' "truly international agreement'" implicated "considerations
and policies significantly different from those found controlling in
Wilko." 0°  Calling a forum-selection clause "an almost indispensable
precondition to achievement of the orderliness and predictability essen-
tial to any international business transaction,"'' the Court said that
"such a provision obviates the danger that a dispute under the agree-
ment might be submitted to a forum hostile to the interests of one of
the parties or unfamiliar with the problem area involved."'02
By merely distinguishing Wilko before basing its decision on policy
considerations, Scherk did not stimulate lower courts to abandon the
American Safety doctrine's policy-oriented approach."n Indeed, in de-
cisions on claims under various congressional statutes which did not
explicitly address the FAA mandate's effect, several lower courts con-
tinued to cite American Safety to support holdings of inarbitrability.0 4
In light of American Safety's continued vitality, Scherk did not provide
97. 17 C.F.R § 240.10b-5 (1993).
98. 417 U.S. at 514 n.7, 515.
99. Id. at 515. The parties conducted negotiations in the United States. England and Germany
before signing the agreement in Austria and conducting the closing in Switzerland. The agree-
ment concerned the sale of business enterprises organized under the laws of. and primarily
situated in, European nations. The enterprises' activities were largely, if not entirely, directed to
European markets. The agreement provided for arbitration before the International Chamber of
Commerce in Pads, France, and for application of Illinois law. Id. at 503.
100. IL at 515.
101. L. at 516.
102. Id. In the Court's words, "[a] parochial refusal by the courts of one country to enforce
an international arbitration agreement would not only frustrate these purposes, but would invite
unseemly and mutually destructive jockeying by the parties to sce= tactical litigation advantag-
es." l. at 516-17 (footnote omitted).
In the context of an agreement with international underpinnings similar to Scherk's, the
Court recently had upheld the general enforceability of specialized forum selection clauses in
United States courts. See The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 US. 1 (1972). discussed in
Scherk, 417 U.S. at 518.
103. Decisions viewing Scherk as grounded in policy considerations included Mitsubishi Mo-
tors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth. Inc., 723 F.2d 155. 163 (1st Cir. 1983). aj'd in part,
rev'd in part on other growuds and remanded, 473 U.S. 614 (1985); Kamakazi Music Corp. v.
Robbins Music Corp., 684 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1982); Merrill Lynch. Pirce, Fener &
Smith, Inc. v. Moore, 590 F.2d 823, 828 (10th Cir. 1978); Fotochrome. Inc. v. Copal Co, 517
F.2d 512, 516 (2d Cir. 1975).
104. See authorities cited supra notes 45-54.
19941
HeinOnline  -- 26 Conn. L. Rev. 539 1993-1994
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
Congress with reason to reevaluate its emerging practice of explicitly
approving the arbitrability of claims under particular statutes.
2. Establishing the Congressional Intent Standard
In a number of decisions in the early 1980s, the Supreme Court
abandoned Wilko's hostility and articulated unmistakable approval for
commercial arbitration. Foundations for the Court's evolving approach
were two propositions articulated in Scherk. Without citing Wilko's
critique, Scherk had stressed that Congress intended the FAA to
"revers[e] centuries of judicial hostility to arbitration agreements, ' s
and to "place arbitration agreements 'upon the same footing as other
contracts .... m106
Even as the Supreme Court reiterated Scherk's two propositions
early in the decade,"°7 however, some lower courts continued to cite
American Safety and find exceptions to the FAA mandate for claims
under various congressional statutes which did not explicitly address the
105. 417 U.S. at 510, citing H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1924). See Gilmer
v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1651 (1991) (restating this proposition);
MeMahon v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 482 U.S. 220, 225 (1987) (quoting same). See also
Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 474 (1989) (FAA was
designed to "overrule the judiciary's longstanding refusal to enforce agreements to arbitrate")
(quoting Dean Witter Reynolds Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1985)); Mitsubishi, 473
U.S. at 625 n.14 (same).
106. 417 U.S. at 511, quoting H.R. REP. No. 96, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2 (1924). See
Gilmer, 111 S. CL at 1651, 1656 (restating this proposition); Volt, 489 U.S. at 474, 478 (same);
McMahon, 482 U.S. at 225-26 (same); Byrd, 470 U.S. at 219 (same).
107. See Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 216-21 & n.6 (rejecting "doctrine of intertwining" and holding
that when a complaint raises both arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims, district court must grant
motion to compel arbitration of arbitrable claims; because the FAA's "preeminent concern" is to
enforce private arbitration agreements, courts must "rigorously enforce agreements to arbi-
trate, . . at least absent a countervailing policy manifested in another federal statute"). See
also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1984) (holding that § 2 of FAA preempted
state statutory provision that state supreme court had interpreted to require judicial consideration
of claims under the statute); id. at 10 (stating that § 2 of the FAA had "declared a national
policy favoring arbitration"); id. at 10-11 (discerning "only two limitations" on the enforceability
of arbitration agreements governed by the FAA mandate: such an agreement must be part of a
written maritime contract or contract "evidencing a transaction involving commerce," and the
agreement may be revoked on "grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract"). Cf. Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 28 (1983) (holding
that district court abused its discretion in staying action pending parallel state court suit's resolu-
tion); id at 24 (describing § 2 of the FAA as "a congressional declaration of a liberal federal
policy favoring arbitration agreements" and instructing that "questions of arbitrability must be
addressed with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration"); id. at 24-25 (speci-
fying that "any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of
arbitration, whether the problem at hand is the construction of the contract language itself or an
allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to arbitrability').
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mandate's effect.' Such citation and findings continued even after
the Court, in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.
in 1985,'09 undercut American Safety's doctrinal bases and stated that
the mandate's effect on federal statutory claims depends on congressio-
nal intent."' The lower courts' approach left Congress with continu-
ing reason to articulate its own intent to approve the arbitrability of
claims under various statutes.
a. Mitsubishi
Mitsubishi's principal question concerned the arbitrability of an
American automobile dealer's Sherman Act counterclaims. The dealer
alleged that two major automobile companies were parties to an interna-
tional cartel that had restrained competition in the American market by
preventing it from transshipping surplus vehicles from Puerto Rico to
other dealers in the American market.
Mitsubishi discussed congressional intent at an unusual point in the
opinion. The Court held that under general principles of contract inter-
pretation, the American dealer had agreed to arbitrate the Sherman Act
counterclaims.' Where a claim derives from statute, the Court in-
structed, these principles control unless Congress has expressed intent to
remove the claim from the FAA mandate:
Just as it is the congressional policy manifested in the Federal
Arbitration Act that requires courts liberally to construe the
scope of arbitration agreements covered by that Act, it is the
congressional intention expressed in some other statute on which
the courts must rely to identify any category of claims as to
which agreements to arbitrate will be held unenforce-
able .... 112
The Court specified two sources of congressional meaning: "[Thel
intention will be deducible from text or legislative history ....
Mitsubishi proceeded to hold the American dealer's Sherman Act
counterclaims arbitrable in accordance with the FAA mandate. The
108. See authorities cited supra notes 45-54.
109. 473 U.S. 614 (1985).
110. See authorities cited supra notes 48. 50; see also infra notes 122-25 and accompanying
text.
111. 473 U.S. at 624-25.
112. Id. at 627.
113. L at 627-28 (citations omitted).
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holding, however, turned on Scherk rather than on further discussion of
congressional intent underlying the Sherman Act. Writing for the Court,
Justice Harry A. Blackmun concluded that enforcement of the arbitra-
tion agreement was required by concerns of international comity, re-
spect for the capacities of foreign and transnational tribunals, and sensi-
tivity to the international commercial system's need for predictability in
dispute resolution." 4
Because Mitsubishi based its holding on policy considerations relat-
ing to the arbitration agreement's international context, the Court found
it "unnecessary""'  to decide the continued validity of American Safe-
ty, whose Sherman Act holding had arisen from a domestic dispute. In
dicta, however, Mitsubishi spent six pages expressing "skepticismn" 6
about that validity.
After undermining American Safety's procedural-adequacy"'7 and
relative-bargaining-position prongs," 8 Mitsubishi questioned the validi-
ty of the earlier decision's policy-importance prong." 9 Mitsubishi
linked policy importance to both procedural adequacy and relative bar-
gaining position: "[So long as the prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate its statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute
will continue to serve both its remedial and deterrent function."'20
Several lower courts concluded that Justice Blackmun's discussion
of congressional intent had "signaled a new approach to the arbitrability
of statutory claims."'' As matters soon developed, however,
Mitsubishi's dicta did not kill the American Safety doctrine in the lower
courts. In 1986, in McMahon v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,'2
114. Il at 629 (citing Scherk).
115. Id.
116. Id. at 632.
117. Id. at 633, 634 ("[Aldaptability and access to expertise are hallmarks of arbitration"
declining to presume that arbitrators would necessarily be biased in favor of alleged antitrust
violators).
118. Id. at 632-33 (declining to presume that arbitration agreements covering antitrust claims
would be contracts of adhesion).
119. Id. at 634-37.
120. Id. at 637. See also id. at 635 (Congress intended private antitrust suits primarily to
compensate injured claimants, and only incidentally to serve a policing function).
121. Genesco, Inc. v. T. Kakiuchi & Co., 815 F.2d 840, 848 (2d Cir. 1987). See also, e.g.,
Mayaja, Inc. v. Bodkin, 803 F.2d 157, 161. 163 n.6 (5th Cir. 1986), vacated on other grounds
and remanded for further consideration in light of McMahon, 482 U.S. 923 (1987), rev'd on
remand, 824 F.2d 439 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 927 (1987); Steinberg v. Illinois Co.,
635 F. Supp. 615, 619 (N.D. I. 1986); Bob Ladd, Inc. v. Adcock, 633 F. Supp. 241, 243.44
(E.D. Ark. 1986); Brener v. Becker Paribas Inc., 628 F. Supp. 442, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
122. 788 F.2d 94 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
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the Second Circuit held unenforceable predispute arbitration agreements
covering claims under section 10(b) of the 1934 Act or under RICO.
The section 10(b) holding reaffirmed the circuit's settled law.'2 The
RICO holding, however, was unencumbered by binding precedent. The
court of appeals cited American Safety to support the conclusion that
"[e]nforcement of the RICO statute is particularly appropriate in a judi-
cial forum because of strong policy concerns."2 4 Before the Supreme
Court reversed the RICO holding fourteen months later, several lower
courts had adopted it and the court of appeals' rationale.' 25
b. McMahon and Rodriguez
In Shearson/American Express, Inc. v. McMahon in 1987,'26 the
Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit's section 10(b) and RICO
holdings. Not only did the Supreme Court's McMahon decision articu-
late the emergent congressional intent standard with a directness
Mitsubishi may have lacked; the decision also refashioned Mitsubishi's
formulation by identifying a third source of intent:
The Arbitration Act, standing alone.... mandates enforcement
of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims. Like any statutory
directive, the Arbitration Act's mandate may be overridden by a
contrary congressional command .... If Congress did intend to
limit or prohibit waiver of a judicial forum for a particular
claim, such an intent "will be deducible from [the statute's] text
or legislative history," . . . or from an inherent conflict between
arbitration and the statute's underlying purposes.127
123. See 788 F.2d at 96-98 (citing decisions). Unenforceability was also the settled § 10(b)
law in most other circuits. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
124. 788 F.2d at 98-99.
125. See, e.g., Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weede, 806 F.2d 291, 298-300 (1st
Cir. 1986); Preston v. Kruezer, 641 F. Supp. 1163. 1178 (N.D. Ill. 1986); Fisher v. Prudential-
Bache Sec., Inc., 635 F. Supp. 234, 237 (D. Md. 1986). a.fd in part and rev'd in part withoaut
opinion, 831 F.2d 290 (4th Cir. 1987); Douglas v. Dean Wiitter Reynolds, Inc., No. 86-22E0-S.
1986 U.S. Dist. LEXIS (D. Kan. Sept. 26. 1986).
126. 482 U.S. 220 (1987).
127. Id. at 226-27 (emphasis supplied) (citations omitted) (brackets by the Court).
Judicial analysis is fundamentally different where the claim arises under a state statute
rather than a congressional statute. The FAA does not contain an express preemption provision.
but the Supreme Court has held state law preempted to the extent it conflicts with the federal
Act. In Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11-12 (1984), the Court held that § 2 of the
FAA preempted a California Franchise Investment Law provision which the state supreme court
had interpreted to require judicial consideration of claims under that law. Keating concluded that
in enacting § 2. "Congress declared a national policy favoring arbitration and withdrew the
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By enforcing the FAA mandate with respect to section 10(b) claims
in the face of Wilko's 1933 Act holding, McMahon introduced an
anomaly into the law.12 1 The 1933 and 1934 Acts carry functionally
indistinguishable investor-protection purposes,'29 with the 1933 Act
primarily regulating the initial distribution of securities and the 1934
Act primarily regulating trading in previously distributed securities on
national exchanges and in the over-the-counter markets.
30
power of the states to require a judicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contract-
ing parties agreed to resolve by arbitration:' Id. at 10.
A year earlier, the Supreme Court had determined that § 2 is a "congressional declaration
of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding any state substantive
or procedural policies to the contrary." Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr.
Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983). See also, e.g., Perry v. Thomas, 482 U.S. 483, 484, 489-91
(1987) (§ 2 of FAA preempted California Labor Code provision which provided that actions to
collect wages may be maintained "without regard to the existence of any private agreement to
arbitrate"). But see Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees, 489 U.S. 468, 470
(1989) (where the parties agreed that their arbitration agreement would be governed by Califor-
nia law, FAA did not preempt California Arbitration Act provision which allowed court to stay
arbitration pending resolution of related litigation). Cf. Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Connolly, 883
F.2d 1114 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 956 (1990) (§ 2 of FAA preempted state
administrative regulations that sought to restrict enforceability of predispute arbitration clauses in
securities brokerage agreements).
128. The 1934 Act's antiwaiver and jurisdictional provisions closely resemble their 1933 Act
counterparts. See 15 U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1988); 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988); 15 U.S.C. § 77n
(1988); 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (1988). The 1934 Act's antiwaver provision voids "[a]ny condition,
stipulation, or provision binding any person to waive compliance with any provision of [the
Act]." Compare the 1933 Act antiwaiver provision, supra text accompanying note 25. The 1934
Act's jurisdictional provision differs from the 1933 Act's chiefly insofar as the former confers
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction on the federal courts. See generally Thomas L. Hazen,
Allocation of Jurisdiction Between the State and Federal Courts For Private Remedies Under
the Federal Securities Law, 60 N.C. L. REV. 707, 709 (1982) (differences among the various
federal securities statutes in allocating judicial jurisdiction over private actions "may be nothing
more than the result of unfortunate legislative apathy or inattention").
129. See 48 Stat. 74 (1933 Act); id. at 881 (1934 Act).
130. See. e.g., I Louis Loss & JOEL SELIGMAN, SECURITIES REGULATION 227-28 (1989).
Indeed, the historical record justifies the conclusion that the two acts are "as closely related as
two nominally separate statutes could be." 6 Louis Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 3915 (Supp.
1969). After an early fruitless effort to draft a securities bill that would have regulated both dis-
tribution and trading, President Roosevelt settled on separate bills that together served as the
foundation of a unified regulatory program. See, e.g., ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE COM-
ING OF THE NEw DEAL 440 (1959); JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET
50-53 (1982). The President stressed this unity in both of his messages to Congress recommend-
ing enactment of the Acts. See H.R. Doc. No. 12, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 77 CONG.
REC. 937 (1933); 78 CONG. REC. 2264 (1934). The two Acts were enacted by the same Con-
gress. See 1934 Act, ch. 404, 48 Stat. 881 (1934) (73d Cong.); 1933 Act, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74
(1933) (same). Lawmakers in 1933 knew that the securities bill primarily regulating initial dis-
tribution would be followed swiftly by one primarily regulating later trading; in turn, lawmakers
in 1934 knew of the close relationship of that year's securities bill to the 1933 Act. See Doug-
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In view of this intimate relationship, Wilko and McMahon could not
coexist logically. In 1989, the Supreme Court overruled Wilko in Rodri-
guez de Quifas v. ShearsonAmerican Express, Inc.' Rodriguez con-
cluded that Wilko's critique of arbitration was "pervaded by ... 'the
old judicial hostility to arbitration,' 13. and thus was "far out of step
with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this
method of resolving disputes." '133
When Congress enacted the ADA shortly after Rodriguez, however,
the lawmakers still had significant reason to articulate their own intent
to approve the FAA mandate's operation." Where a federal statute
remained silent concerning that effect, the congressional intent
standard's "inherent conflict" prong presumably required a showing of
profound incompatibility between arbitration and the statute's underlying
purposes.135  Lower courts nonetheless continued to invoke consider-
ations relating to policy importance, procedural adequacy and relative
bargaining position as grounds for satisfying that prong." Indeed, on-
lis E. Abrams, The Scope of Liability Under Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933: "Partici-
pation" and the Pertinent Legislative Materials, 15 FORDHAhI URB. L.J 877, 906 n. 156-57
(1987). The 1934 Act amended the 1933 Act in significant respects. See 1934 Act. ch. 404, §§
201-210, 48 Stat. 905-09 (1934). Finally, as enacted and as amended for more than a half cen-
tury, the 1934 Act refers to 1933 Act provisions and thus helps cement the intimate relationship
between the two statutes. See Abrams, supra at 907 n.159.
131. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). Rodriguez was decided by a five-four majority. The disenters
concluded that the Court had a "duty" to adhere to Wilko's holding because Congress had left
the holding undisturbed for three and a half decades. Ld. at 486 (Stevans. J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 480 (citation omitted).
133. Id. at 481.
134. The ADA expressed this intent in § 513, which is discussed infra text accompanying
notes 164-67.
135.' Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary defines the adjective "inherWnt" as "involved in the
constitution or essential character of something." WEBsTER'S Nmv CO 'EGiATE DICTIOARY 622
(1985) (also as "belonging by nature or settled habit" or "intrinsic"). The Supreme Court fre-
quently interprets congressional statutes according to the dictionary definitions of language the
lawmakers employ. See, eg., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163. 1169-70 (1993); Unit-
ed States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317 & n.7 (1990); United States Dept. of Justice v. Re-
porters Comm. 489 U.S. 749. 763-64 & n.16 (1989). The Court's own standards thus may be
interpreted in similar fashion.
136. See, e.g., Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l. Inc., 858 F.2d 1304. 1306-07 (8th
Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 848 (1989) (discussing "an inherent conflict between arbitra-
tion and the underlying purposes of Title VII" because of "the lack of expetise of arbitrators,
the inferior factfinding process, and the inability of arbitration to judicially construe Title VI by
reference to public law concepts"; concluding that "in the passage of Title VII it was the con-
gressional intent that arbitration is unable to pay sufficient attention to the transcendent public
interest in the enforcement of Title VII") (citations omitted); Borenstein v. Tucker, 757 F. Supp.
3, 4-5 (D. Conn. 1991) (agreeing with decision in Nicholson V. CPC Int'l Inc.. 877 F.2d 221
(3d Cir. 1989); Bierdeman v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 211, 213-14 (N.D.
1994]
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ly three weeks after Rodriguez, the Third Circuit held that "the ADEA
is one of the statutory schemes that present . 'inherent conflict
[with] arbitration. ' '" 137 The court of appeals stressed not only "the in-
adequacy of arbitration in many cases to enforce the [ADEA] effective-
ly,"'38 but also "[tihe disparity in bargaining power between an em-
ployer and an individual employee."'
139
Gilmer reached the Supreme Court after the Fourth Circuit created a
conflict among the circuits by holding ADEA claims arbitrable in ac-
cordance with the FAA mandate." The Supreme Court's Gilmer de-
cision disabled courts from considering any of the three traditional
grounds in determining inherent conflict between arbitration and the
purposes underlying federal statutes which, like the ADEA, remained
silent concerning the mandate's effect.
3. Gilmer
a. Policy Importance
Gilmer rejected the contention that arbitration inherently conflicted
with the underlying purposes of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967 because the statute is "designed ... to further important
social policies.'' The Court acknowledged that Congress intended
the ADEA to articulate a national interest in eradicating age discrimina-
Cal. 1990), rev'd without opinion, 963 F.2d 378 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 328 (1992)
(policy importance); Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 547, 548 (S.D. Tex.
1989) (finding "inherent conflict between arbitration and the congressional purpose of Title VII"
for reasons of procedural adequacy) (citation omitted), aft'd, 905 F.2d 104, 106 (5th Cir. 1990)
("The purpose . . . of Title VII indicate[s] that Congress intended federal courts to exercise
final responsibility for enforcement of Title VII') (citation omitted), vacated and remanded for
further consideration in light of Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991), rev'd and remanded on re-
mand, 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991), dismissal affTd, 975 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1992). See also,
e.g., Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 204 (4th Cir. 1990) (Widener, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting from holding that ADEA claims are arbitrable under the FAA mandate;
discussing "many reasons a remedy by way of arbitration is not as effective as a judgment of a
court ... : a different fact-finding process; not as complete a record; the usual rules of evi-
dence do not apply; ... lack of compulsory process" and lack of jury trial) (citation omitted),
aff'd, 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991); Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 1989),
discussed infra text accompanying notes 137-39.
137. Nicholson v. CPC Int'l Inc., 877 F.2d 221, 227 (3d Cir. 1989) (brackets by the court).
138. Id. at 228.
139. Id. at 229.
140. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 196 n.1 (4th Cir. 1990), aff'd,
111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
141. 111 S. Ct. at 1653.
[Vol. 26:521
HeinOnline  -- 26 Conn. L. Rev. 546 1993-1994
ARBITRABILITY iN CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
tion.142 The Court, however, "[did] not perceive any inherent inconsis-
tency" between arbitration and this important policy goal. 3
Two sentences of the Gilmer opinion were crucial to disposition of
this contention:
The Sherman Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, RICO,
and the Securities Act of 1933 all are designed to advance im-
portant public policies, but... claims under those statutes are
appropriate for arbitration. "[S]o long as the prospective litigant
effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action
in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both its
remedial and deterrent function." 144
The first sentence cited Mitsubishi, McMahon and Rodriguez. Taken
alone, the sentence indicates that courts may not lightly find congressio-
nal intent to override the FAA mandate based on the asserted impor-
tance of a statute's underlying policy goals. RICO's private cause of
action ("civil RICO") has never served, and does not now serve, the
limited policy goals for which Congress enacted RICO more than two
decades ago."4 It would be difficult, however, to cite a business or
142. ld. at 1652-53.
143. Id. at 1653.
144. Ld. (brackets by the Court) (citations omitted) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)).
145. Congress enacted RICO as Title IX of the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970
(OCCA), Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified as amended in various sections of 18, 28
U.S.C. (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). The OCCA's purpose was to "seek the eradication of orga-
nized crime in the United States... by providing enhanced sanctions and new remedies to
deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime" See Statement of Find-
ings and Purpose, 84 Stat. at 922-23 (1970). RICO's narrower purpose wvas to "elimina[e] ...
the infiltration of organized crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operating in in-
terstate commerce." S. REP. No. 617, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 76 (1969). In turn. Congress in-
tended civil RICO to provide compensation to persons suffering business or pro-ty injury
proximately caused by RICO violations. See, eg., Hearings on S. 30 and Related Proposals
before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiclmy 91st Cong., 2d Seas. 520
(1970) (remarks of Rep. Steiger); 116 CONG. Re. 35,346.47 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Steiger).
See also Holmes v. SIPC, 112 S. Ct. 1311, 1316-18 (1992) (finding congressional intent to
limit civil RICO recovery to persons whose injury was proximately caused by the RICO viola-
tion).
RICO's enactors held a limited conception of "organized crime" and "rcketeering." In the
debates that produced the OCCA and RICO. the lawmakers variously described the targets as
(1) "the Cosa Nostra," see, e.g., 116 CONG. REc. 585-86, 592-95 (1970) (remarks of Sen.
McClellan); id. at 607 (remarks of Sen. Byrd); it at 846 (remarks of Sen. McClellan); id. at
952-53 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond); Id. at 956 (remarks of Sen. Hruskn): id at 963 (remarks
of Sen. McClellan), (2) "the Mafia," see, eg., id. at 586, 589. 592, 593, 600 (remarks of Sen.
McClellan); id. at 832 (remarks of Sen. Case); id. at 846 (remarks of Sen. McClellan); Id. at
19941
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commercial statute which Congress designed to serve policy goals more
important than those of the antitrust or securities acts at issue in the
three earlier decisions. t46
953 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond); id. at 957 (remarks of Sen. Hruska); 115 CONo. REC. 35,215
(1969) (remarks of Rep. Bennett); id. at 35,311 (remarks of Rep. Fountain), (3) "mobsters," see,
e.g., id. at 35,309 (remarks of Rep. Brotzman); id at 35,311 (remarks of Rep. Fountain); Id.
(remarks of Rep. Broomfield); id. at 35,321 (remarks of Rep. Price), (4) "the mob," see, e.g.,
id at 35,311 (remarks of Rep. Broomfield), (5) "gangsters," see, e.g., id at 35,311 (remarks of
Rep. Fountain); id (remarks of Rep. Broomfield), (6) "the underworld," see 116 CoNe. REC.
602 (1970) (remarks of Sen. Hruska), (7) "families" see, e.g., id. at 593 (remarks of Sen.
McClellan); id at 35,200 (remarks of Rep. St Germain); 115 CONG. REC. 35,328 (1969) (re-
marks of Rep. Meskill), or (8) "syndicates," see, e.g., id. at 35,201 (remarks of Rep. PofO; Id.
at 35,205 (remarks of Rep. Mikva); id. at 35,215 (remarks of Rep. Fascell); id at 35,290 (re-
marks of Rep. Poff); id at 35,305 (remarks of Rep. Hogan); id. at 35,307 (remarks of Rep.
Scheuer); id at 35,309 (remarks of Rep. Brotzman); id. (remarks of Rep. Minshall); id. at
35,319 (remarks of Rep. Roth); id at 35,327 (remarks of Rep. Randall); id. at 35,362 (remarks
of Rep. Pepper); id at 36,294 (remarks of Sen. Hruska) (quoting testimony of Attorney Gener-
al); id at 36,296 (remarks of Sen. Dole). Reinforcing their limited conception of organized
crime and racketeering, the lawmakers stressed the involvement of the legislation's targets in
such activities as gambling, prostitution, loansharking and bootlegging. See, e.g., 116 CONG.
REC. 586 (1970) (remarks of Sen. McClellan); id at 590-91 (remarks of Sen. McClellan): Id. at
603-05 (remarks of Sen. Allott); id. at 606 (remarks of Sen. Byrd); id. at 844 (remarks of Sen.
Kennedy); id at 952 (remarks of Sen. Thurmond).
Virtually no civil RICO claims have ever named defendants engaged in organized crime or
racketeering as RICO's enactors understood those terms. At the same time, RICO's expansive
language reaches much conduct (particularly fraudulent conduct) engaged in by ordinary defen-
dants. Since the early 1980s, this expansiveness has enabled civil RICO to operate across the
broad range of American law, regardless of the defendant's status or other circumstance. RICO's
enactors were not unaware that civil RICO might reach an occasional non-racketeer defendant.
See, e.g., 115 CONG. REC. 18,940 (1969) (remarks of Sen. McClellan). In light of the debates.
however, the lawmakers cannot fairly be said to have anticipated the breadth of civil RICO's
ultimate operation. Concerning RICO's language and legislative history generally and civil
RICO's unanticipated evolution, see DOUGLAS E. ABRAMS, THE LAw oF CivIL RICO §§ 1.1-1.5
(1991 & Supp. 1992). See also, e.g., Midwest Grinding Co. v. Spitz, 976 F.2d 1016, 1022 (7th
Cir. 1992) (discussing the "widespread attempts to turn routine commercial disputes into civil
RICO actions"); River City Mkts., Inc. v. Fleming Foods W., Inc., 960 F.2d 1458, 1465 (9th
Cir. 1992) (civil RICO's "possibility of treble damages and attorneys fees provides a powerful
incentive to plead every commercial disappointment in terms of victimization by racketeers").
146. The Court itself has lauded the Sherman Act as "the Magna Carta of free enterprise,"
United States v. Topco Assocs., Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972), and as a "charter of freedom."
Sugar Inst., Inc. v. United States, 297 U.S. 553, 600 (1936); Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United
States, 288 U.S. 344, 359 (1933) (same). See also Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. at 610 ("Antitrust
laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are ... as important to the preservation of
economic freedom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of
our fundamental personal freedoms"); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321,
371 (1963) (discussing the "magnitude" of the "value choice" made by Sherman Act); Northern
Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958) (calling Sherman Act a "comprehensive charter
of economic liberty"); Lawlor v. National Screen Serv. Corp., 349 U.S. 322, 329 (1955) (dis-
cussing "the public interest in vigilant enforcement of the antitrust laws" through private ac-
tions).
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The second sentence of Gilmer's crucial language quoted
Mitsubishi.47 This sentence overshadows the first by concluding that
the importance of a congressional statute's underlying policy goals has
no effect at all on judicial measurement of inherent conflict with arbi-
tration. The second sentence links policy importance to the two other
traditional factors, procedural adequacy and relative bargaining position.
The Court's linkage makes judicial resolution of challenges to arbitra-
tion based on policy importance depend on resolution of challenges to
arbitration based on the two other factors. The Court proceeded to state
that challenges grounded in the two other factors do not bear on inher-
ent conflict, but rather are to be resolved on a case-by-case basis in
judicial proceedings to vacate arbitral awards under the FAA. 4'
b. Procedural Adequacy of Arbitration
Plaintiff Gilmer mounted a broad assault on arbitration's procedural
adequacy. He contended that arbitration inherently conflicted with the
ADEA's underlying purposes because arbitration panels will be biased;
because discovery in arbitration is much more limited than in the feder-
al courts; because arbitrators often do not issue written opinions; and
because arbitration assertedly does not provide for broad equitable relief
and class actions. 4 9
The Court rejected the plaintiff's assault as inconsistent with the
"strong endorsement" of arbitration expressed in Rodriguez. ' The
opinion distinguished Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co. and two other
decisions which arose from arbitration pursuant to collective-bargaining
agreements (the "Alexander trio").' 5' Among other issues, the Alexan-
The Court similarly has perceived the two seminal securities acts as foundations of our
national economic order, enacted in the face of the 1929 stock market crash and the ensuing
depression to prevent fraud and to achieve a high standard of business ethics. See, eg., United
States v. Naftalin, 441 U.S. 768, 775 (1979); Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 US. 185, 195
(1976); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723. 727-28 (1975); SEC v. Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180. 186 (1963).
147. 473 US. at 637. See supra text accompanying notes 117-20.
148. 111 S. CL at 1653-55, discussed infra text accompanying notes 149-56. Concerning tih
FAA's limited grounds for judicial vacatur, see infra note 227 and accompanying text.
149. 111 S. Ct. at 1654-55.
150. Ld. at 1654 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. ShearsonfAm. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 417.
481 (1989)).
151. 111 S. CL at 1656. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 US. 36 (1974)
(employee's right to a judicial trial de novo under Title VII of Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not
foreclosed by the employee's prior submission of the discrimination claim to final arbitration
under a collective-brgaining agreement), discussed infra text accompanying notes 248-58. See
1994]
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der trio questioned the capacity of arbitral procedure to permit vindica-
tion of the statutory' rights at issue.'52  Gilmer concluded that
challenges to FAA arbitration grounded in procedural adequacy are
"best left for resolution in specific cases" in judicial proceedings to
vacate arbitral awards.'53
c. Relative Bargaining Position
Gilmer rejected the contention that arbitration inherently conflicted
with the ADEA's underlying purposes because employers and employ-
ees often occupy unequal bargaining positions."5 The Court first not-
ed that McMahon and Rodriguez had upheld the FAA mandate's en-
forcement despite the unequal bargaining positions that securities dealers
and investors may occupy 55 Gilmer then concluded that contentions
of unequal bargaining position, like contentions of procedural inadequa-
cy, are "best left for resolution in specific cases.' 56
also McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (in action under 42 U.S.C. §
1983, a federal court should not accord res judicata or collateral estoppel effect to an award in
an arbitration pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight
Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728 (1981) (employee is not barred from suing in federal district court,
alleging violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act's minimum wage provisions, after having
unsuccessfully submitted a wage claim based on the same underlying facts to a joint grievance
committee pursuant to the provisions of the union's collective-bargaining agreement).
Gilmer distinguished the Alexander trio on the grounds that they were not decided under
the FAA; that they did not concern enforceability of agreements to arbitrate statutory claims, but
rather "the quite different issue" whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded later
judicial resolution of statutory claims; and that they concerned arbitration under collective-bar-
gaining agreements and thus implicated a tension between collective representation and individual
statutory rights, a tension not present when parties represent themselves in the arbitral proceed-
ings. 111 S. Ct. at 1657. This tension, and Alexander's influence on the legislative histories of
the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act, are discussed infra text accompanying notes 248-58.
152. The trio's broad language did not explicitly distinguish between labor arbitration and
commercial arbitration. See, e.g., Alexander, 415 U.S. at 56 ("Arbitral procedures, while well
suited to the resolution of contractual disputes, make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate
forum for the final resolution of rights created by Title VII."); Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 744
("[A]rbitral procedures [are] less protective of individual statutory rights than are judicial proce-
dures."); McDonald, 466 U.S. at 288-92 (quoting from Alexander and Barrentine).
153. Concerning the FAA's grounds for judicial vacatur, see infra note 227 and accompanying
texL
154. 111 S. Ct. at 1655.
155. Id
156. IL at 1656. The volume of ADEA claims, including ones covered by arbitration agree-
ments, is likely to rise as employers lay off older employees in the current economic climate.
See Thomas J. Lueck, Job Loss Anger: Age Bias Cases Soar in Region, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12,
1993, at 1.
HeinOnline  -- 26 Conn. L. Rev. 550 1993-1994
ARBITRABILIT IN CIVL RIGHTS LEGISLA770N
d. Outlook
In determining inherent conflict under the Mitsubishi-McMahon
congressional intent standard, courts may no longer weigh consider-
ations relating to policy importance, procedural adequacy or relative
bargaining position. By disabling courts from weighing the three
grounds that had produced American Safety and its progeny, Gilmer
effectively inters the policy-oriented analysis that marked the American
Safety doctrine." Mitsubishi had foreshadowed the interment process
with lengthy dictum that expressed "skepticism" about each of the three
grounds.158 In Gilmer, however, removal of the grounds from the ju-
dicial calculus provided the bases for rejecting central contentions of
the plaintiff.
Gilmer makes it virtually impossible, as a practical matter, to estab-
lish inherent conflict under the congressional intent standard. Unless a
congressional statute's text or legislative history establishes an exception
to the FAA mandate, claims under the statute will almost inevitably be
arbitrable in accordance with the mandate. Because congressional si-
lence is thus tantamount to arbitrability, the 1991 Civil Rights Act's
textual "encouragement' of arbitration has little or no greater legal
significance than textual silence would have.
III. ARBITRABIL1TY IN THE ADA AND THE 1991 Crvm RIGHTS ACT
With textual expressions of encouragement, the ADA and the 1991
157. Some lower courts had questioned American Safety's vitality evn before Gilmer. See,
e.g., Kowalski v. Chicago Tribune Co., 854 F.2d 168, 173 (7th Cir. 1988) (determining
arbitrability of antitrust claims); Mayaja. Inc. v. Bodkin, 803 F.2d 157, 163 n.6 (5th Cir. 196),
vacated on other grounds and remanded for further consideration in light of McMahon . rev'd
on remand, 824 F.2d 439 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 482 U.S. 927 (1987) (determniing arbitrability
of civil RICO claims); Hough v. Merrill Lynch. Pierce, Fenner & Smith. Inc., 757 F. Supp.
283, 286 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd without opinion, 946 F.2d 883 (2d Cir. 1991) (determining arbitrab-
ility of antitrust claims); GKG Caribe, Inc. v. Nokia-Mobira, Inc., 725 F. Supp. 109, 111-13
(D.P.R. 1989) (same); Gemco Latinoamerica, Inc. v. Seiko Time Corp., 671 F. Supp. 972, 979
(S.D.N.Y. 1987), on reconsideration, 685 F. Supp. 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (same); Smoky
Greenhaw Cotton Co. v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fener & Smith, Inc., 650 F. Supp. 220, 222
(W.D. Tex.), affd, 805 F.2d 1221 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 US. 928 (1937) (determin-
ing arbitrability of civil RICO claims); Stendig Int'l, Inc. v. B. & B. Italia. S.p.A., 633 F.
Supp. 27, 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (determining arbitrability of antitrust claims).
But see, eg., Page v. Moseley, Hallgarten, Estabrook & Weeden, 806 F.2d 291, 299 (1st
Cir. 1986) (determining arbitrability of civil RICO claims; American Safety's policy.importance
ground "remains alive after Mitsubishi, which only criticized the private attorney general concept
in the context of an international dispute"); McMahon v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 788 F.2d
94, 98 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd on other grounds, 482 U.S. 220 (1987) (same).
158. See supra text accompanying notes 115-20.
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Civil Rights Act approved enforcement of arbitration agreements. Only
the Acts' legislative hi~tories suggest protective qualifications on the
otherwise binding effect of arbitral awards. If the Acts' committee re-
ports are given effect, a claimant would be entitled to a post-arbitral
judicial trial de novo on claims under two of the four statutes touched
by the acts.
A. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 9 seeks to protect
disabled persons from "various forms of discrimination"'" that had
created "an inferior status in our society,"'' and had denied them the
"opportunity to compete on an equal basis." 62 The Act seeks to pro-
vide a "clear and comprehensive mandate" for eliminating discrimina-
tion through "clear, strong, consistent, enforceable standards." 163
Section 513 of the ADA provides that "[w]here appropriate and to
the extent authorized by law, the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution, including ... arbitration, is encouraged to resolve disputes"
arising under the Act."6 The section thus draws no distinction be-
tween commercial arbitration and labor arbitration,165 or between arbi-
tration pursuant to predispute or post-dispute agreement.
"Encouragement" connotes "permission." By encouraging arbitration
of ADA claims, section 513 expresses congressional intent to permit
resolution of such claims in accordance with the FAA mandate. The
section is consistent with congressional statutes which, since the early
1970s, have used only the word "arbitration" to express intent that
claims be subject to the mandate without qualification.'" For its part,
the mandate "authorizes" arbitration, and thus establishes arbitration's
"appropriateness," when an arbitration agreement covers a claim under
general principles of contract interpretation. 67 Accordingly, section
159. Pub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990).
160. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(5) (Supp. IV 1992).
161. IM. § 12101(a)(6).
162. Id. § 12101(a)(9).
163. Id. § 12101(b)(1)(2).
164. Id. § 12212.
165. Section 513's legislative history affirms that the section reaches commercial arbitration:
"whether in the context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an employment contract."
H.R. REP. No. 485(1D, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445,
499.
166. See supra text accompanying notes 59-86.
167. Concerning the role of these principles in the interpretation of arbitration agreements, see,
[V/ol. 26:521
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513 would require rejection of contentions that Congress intended to
exclude ADA claims from the mandate.
Only in the ADA's legislative history did Congress acknowledge
qualifications on the otherwise binding effect of arbitration awards on
claims under the Act. The House Judiciary Committee Report reiterated
section 513's expression of encouragement.'6' But the Report also
stated that "use of alternative dispute mechanisms is intended to supple-
ment, not supplant, the remedies provided by this Act."' 69 This sen-
tence suggests intent to authorize only a form of non-binding arbitral
award. Whether arbitration is pursuant to predispute or post-dispute
agreement, an award would not "supplant" the claimant's right
thereafter to seek judicial redress of ADA claims arising from the cir-
cumstances that were the subject of the arbitration.
The Judiciary Committee Report drew particular attention to
predispute arbitration agreements, noting that Title I of the ADA incor-
porates by reference the remedial provisions of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.170 The Report cited Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co.,171 which held that an employee's right to a judicial trial de novo
under Title VII is not foreclosed by the employee's prior submission of
a discrimination claim to final arbitration under a collective-bargaining
agreement." Concluding that "the approach.., in Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co. applies equally to the ADA,"'13 the Committee
imported that decision's rationale into commercial arbitration of ADA
claims pursuant to predispute agreements. The Committee stated that
"any agreement to submit disputed issues to arbitration, whether in the
context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an employment con-
e.g., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614. 624-28 (1935).
discussed supra text accompanying notes 111-25.
168. See H-R. REP. No. 485(0), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 76-77 (1990). reprinted In 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445. 499-500. See also 136 CONG. REC. H2616 (1990) (remarks of Rep.
Glickman) (ADA bill "establishes an important principle that we ought to try to avoid litiga-
tion. .... if possible, and that encouraging dispute resolution between the parties is a positive
idea").
169. HR. REP. No. 485(IH). 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, 499.
170. 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 500.
171. 415 U.S. 36 (1974), discussed Infta text accompanying notes 248-58.
172. Id
173. HL REP. No. 485(II]), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 77 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
445, 500. The Committee concluded that section 513 does not "preclude rights and remedies
that would otherwise be available to persons with disabilities." Id
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tract, does not preclude the affected person from seeking relief under
the enforcement provisi6ns of this Act."174
The Conference Report proceeded to adopt by reference the Judicia-
ry Committee Report's statement concerning section 513.'7' In partic-
ular, the conferees concurred that in arbitration pursuant to predispute
agreements, the section preserves the exception grounded in Alexander
and the ADA's Title VII pedigree. The conferees stated that "[u]nder
no condition would an arbitration clause in a collective bargaining
agreement or employment contract prevent an individual from pursuing
their rights under the ADA."' 76
B. Civil Rights Act of 1991
The Civil Rights Act of 19911" endured a lengthy gestation peri-
od which began while Congress was still considering the ADA. After
President Bush vetoed civil rights legislation in 1990,178 Congress re-
newed consideration with House passage of H.R. 1 on June 5,
1991.' The Senate passed its own version of the legislation (S.
1745) on October 30, 1991.80 The House passed S. 1745 on Novem-
ber 7, 1991."' The President signed the 1991 Civil Rights Act on
November 25, 1991.182
The 1991 Act continues the ADA's approach of textually encourag-
ing arbitration, subject to protective qualifications acknowledged only in
the legislative history. Section 118 of the 1991 Act mirrors section 513
174. See H.R. REP. No. 485(11), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 76-77 (1990), reprinted In 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 499-500.
175. H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 596, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 89 (1990), reprinted in 136 CONG.
REC. H4582, H4606 (1990) and 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 565, 598.
176. Id.
177. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (codified in various U.S.C. sections).
178. See President's Message to the Senate Returning Without Approval the Civil Rights Act
of 1990, 11 PUt. PAPERs, George Bush 1990, at 1437 (Oct. 22, 1990).
179. See 137 CONG. REc. H3958-59 (1991).
180. See id. at S15,503.
181. See id. at H9557-58.
182. See President's Statement on Signing the Civil Rights Act of 1991. R1 PuD. PAPERS,
George Bush 1990, at 1504-05 (Nov. 21, 1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 768, 769. Pres-
ident Bush explained:
[T]he Act encourages voluntary agreements between employers and employees to rely
on alternative mechanisms such as mediation and arbitration. This provision is among
the most valuable in the Act because of the important contribution that voluntary
private arrangements can make in the effort to conserve the scarce resources of the
Federal judiciary for those matters as to which no alternative forum would be possi-
ble or appropriate.
[V/ol. 26:521
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of the ADA: "Where appropriate and to the extent authorized by law,
the use of alternative means of dispute resolution, including... arbitra-
tion,-is encouraged to resolve disputes arising under the Acts or provi-
sions of Federal law amended by" Title I of the 1991 Act.'8 Like its
ADA counterpart, section 118 draws no distinction between commercial
arbitration and labor arbitration," or between arbitration pursuant to
predispute or post-dispute agreement. The acts and provisions Title I
amended are the ADA, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the
Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the ADEA"
Once again, "encouragement" connotes "permission."'" By en-
couraging arbitral resolution of claims under any of the four amended
acts and provisions, section 118 expresses congressional intent to permit
resolution of these claims in accordance with the FAA mandate. Where
a person contends that Congress intended to exclude from the mandate
claims under any of the four acts or provisions, section 118 thus would
require rejection of the contention.
The 1991 Civil Rights Act's legislative history evinces an effort to
modify section 118's text with respect to claims under Title VII (and
perhaps also claims under the ADA, which adopts by reference Title
VII's remedial provisions). In any event, claims under the other two
amended acts and provisions (the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the
ADEA) remain unaffected by the legislative historyP'
183. Pub. L No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071. 1081 (1991) (codified at various sections of
29 & 42 U.S.C.). See also supra note 164 and accompanying text.
184. Section 118's legislative history affirms that the Section reachts commercial arbitration
"whether in the context of a collective bargaining agreement or in an employment contr.ct."
H.R. REP. No. 40(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991); H.R. REP. No. 40(11), 102d Cong, 1st Sess.
(1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 635, 735.
185. See Pub. L No. 102-166, § 109(a),(b)(2). 105 Stat. 1071, 1077 (1991) (amending the
ADA); §§ 104, 105(a), 106-108, 109(a), (b)(1), 110-112, 113(b), 114, 105 Stat. 1071, 1074-79
(1991) (amending Title VII); § 101, 105 Stat. 1071, 1071-72 (1991) (amending the Civil Rights
Act of 1866); § 115, 105 Stat. 1071, 1079 (1991) (amending the ADEA). See also 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 1981 (1981 & Supp. 1992).
186. See supra text accompanying notes 166-67.
187. The arbitrability of ADEA claims also remains untouched by the Older Workers Benefit
Protection Act of 1990 ("OWBPA"), Pub. L No. 101-433, 104 Stat. 978 (1990) (codified at 29
U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (Supp. IV 1992)), which amended the ADEA. Among other things, tht
OWBPA provides that individuals may not waive "any right or claim under" the ADEA unless
the waiver is "knowing and voluntary." 29 U.S.C. § 626(f) (Supp. IV 1992). TIe OWBPA
provides that an individual's purported waiver is not knowing and voluntary unless, at a mini-
mum. (1) the waiver is part of a written agreement calculated to be understood by the individu-
al, (2) the waiver specifically refers to rights or claims arising under the ADEA. (3) the indi-
vidual does not waive rights or claims that may arise after the waiver is executed, (4) the indi-
vidual waives rights or claims in exchange for consideration in addition to anything of value to
19941
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The modification effort was marked by persistent rancor, which
contrasts sharply with the absence of articulated dispute during congres-
sional consideration of ADA arbitrability a year earlier. In their two-
part Report on H.R. 1, the House Education and Labor Committee and
the House Judiciary Committee each addressed the provision that en-
couraged arbitration.188  The Report's two parts each reaffirmed the
provision's expression of encouragement. - 9 In language closely re-
sembling that of the House Judiciary Committee Report which had
which the individual is already entitled, (5) the individual is advised in writing to consult with
an attorney before executing the agreement, (6) the individual is given a reasonable period with-
in which to consider the agreement, and (7) the individual may revoke the agreement within
seven days after executing it, and the agreement does not become effective until the revocation
period has expired. Il
It has been suggested that the OWBPA's waiver provision might reach the FAA mandate's
effect on arbitration agreements covering ADEA claims. See, e.g., Martha S. Weisel, Effec-
tiveness of Arbitration Clauses In Employment Contracts, 47 ARB. J. 19, 24 (June 1992). In
particular, if the waiver provision enjoys such reach, the third proviso would preclude enforce-
ment of predispute arbitration agreements covering such claims. The issue of the provision's
reach was not decided in Gilmer, whose underlying dispute had arisen before the OWBPA's
effective date.
It seems apparent that Congress did not intend the OWBPA's waiver provision to affect
the FAA mandate's operation with respect to either post-dispute or predispute arbitration agree-
ments. Neither the OWBPA's text nor its legislative history makes any mention of arbitration or
the mandate. This omission stands in stark contrast to legislation which, for nearly two decades,
had referred specifically to arbitration when the lawmakers intended to reach the mandate's
effect on agreements covering claims under a particular statute. See supra text accompanying
notes 59-86. Indeed, only two months before enacting the OWBPA, Congress referred specifical-
ly to arbitration when it enacted the ADA. See supra text accompanying note 162.
The OWBPA's legislative history indicates that Congress intended to regulate only an
individual's waiver of substantive rights and claims under the ADEA when the individual con-
siders whether to accept forced early retirement: "At a minimum, the waiving party must have
genuinely intended to release ADEA claims and must have understood that he was accom-
plishing this goal:' See S. REP. No. 263, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 31-32, (1990) reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1509, 1537. In the absence of affirmative indication of congressional intent to
affect the FAA mandate's operation, any decision concerning the OWBPA's reach would likely
depend on the Supreme Court's admonition that "questions of arbitrability must be addressed
with a healthy regard for the federal policy favoring arbitration:' See Moses H. Cone Hosp. v.
Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983), quoted in Gilmer, 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1652.
Consistent with this admonition, courts resolve doubts about such questions in favor of
arbitrability. Where the issue is the enforceability of an arbitration agreement which otherwise
satisfies the FAA mandate, courts would likely find that the various determinants of congressio-
nal intent do not demonstrate that the OWBPA created an exception to the mandate.
188. See H.R. REP. No. 40(1), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) ("H.R. REP. I"); H.R. REP. No.
40(11), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) ("H.R. REP. II"). The reports are reprinted in 1991
U.S.C.CA.N. 549, 694 respectively. No Senate Report was submitted with the legislation.
189. See H.R. REP. L supra note 188, at 97; H.R. REP. 11, supra note 188, at 41, reprinted
in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 635, 735 (citation omitted).
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accompanied the ADA, 9° each part then imported Alexander's Title VII
holding:
[T]he use of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms is intend-
ed to supplement, not supplant, the remedies provided by Title
VII .... Mhe Committee believes that any agreement to
submit disputed issues to arbitration, whether in the context of a
collective bargaining agreement or in an employment contract,
does not preclude the affected person from seeking relief under
the enforcement provisions of Title VII. This view is consistent
with the Supreme Court's interpretation of Title VII in Alexan-
der v. Gardner-Denver Co ..... The Committee does not
intend for the inclusion of this section to be used to preclude
rights and remedies that would otherwise be available."'
The two-part Committee Report, however, was not the legislative
history's only word concerning arbitrability. As part of his remarks
during Senate consideration of S. 1745 on October 30, 1991, Senator
Robert Dole of Kansas placed in the record an interpretive memoran-
dum expressing the administration's views on the proposed legisla-
tion." As part of his remarks during House consideration of S. 1745
on November 7, 1991, Representative Henry . Hyde also placed in the
record an interpretive memorandum concerning the proposed legisla-
tion.193 The Dole and Hyde memoranda cited the recent Gilmer deci-
sion with approval."l In identical language, the memoranda then said
this concerning the provision ultimately enacted as section 118:
This provision encourages the use of alternative means of dis-
pute resolution, including binding arbitration, where the parties
knowingly and voluntarily elect to use these methods.
In light of the litigation crisis facing this country and the
increasing sophistication and reliability of alternatives to litiga-
tion, there is no reason to disfavor the use of such forums."
190. See supra text accompanying notes 168-76.
191. See HIL REP. I, supra note 188, at 97; HR. REP. IL supra note 188. at 41. reprinted
in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 635, 735 respectively (citation omitted). Alexander is dics supra text
accompanying note 171, infra text accompanying notes 248-58.
192. See 137 CONG. REc. S15.472 (1991) (remarks of Sen. Dole).
193. See idU at H9542-43 (remarks of Rep. Hyde). The Dole and Hyde memoranda appeared
more than five months after the two-part Committee Report. See supra note 188.
194. See 137 CONG. REC. S15o478, H9548 (1991).
195. Id.
1994]
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As part of his remarks during House consideration of S. 1745 on
November 7, 1991, Representative Don Edwards also placed in the
record an interpretive memorandum. 9 6 The memorandum reaffimned
section 118's expression of encouragement, then explained that the sec-
tion "is intended to supplement, not supplant, remedies provided by
Title VII, and is not to be used to preclude rights and remedies that
would otherwise be available."'" The memorandum continued that the
section
is intended to be consistent with decisions such as Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co . . . ., which protect employees from being
required to agree in advance to arbitrate disputes under Title
VII and to refrain from exercising their right to seek relief
under Title VII itself. This section contemplates the use of
voluntary arbitration to resolve specific disputes after they have
arisen, not coercive attempts to force employees in advance to
forego statutory rights. No approval whatsoever is intended of
the Supreme Court's recent decision in [Gilmer],. or any applica-
tion or extension of it to Title VII. 98
The two-part Committee Report's treatment of Title VII remedies
departs from section 118's unqualified expression of encouragement,
and hence of permission, for arbitration. The Report reaffirms the en-
forceability of arbitration agreements covering claims under any of the
four Acts and provisions amended by the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 99
But the first quoted sentence suggests intent to authorize only a form of
non-binding award in arbitration pursuant to predispute and post-dispute
agreements alike; the claimant would retain a post-arbitral right to sue
under Title VII (and perhaps also under the ADA) based on the cir-
cumstances that were the subject of the arbitration. By importing Alex-
ander into commercial arbitration, the Report's remaining quoted sen-
tences reinforce this suggestion of intent with respect to arbitration
pursuant to predispute agreements.
The Dole and Hyde memoranda are inconsistent with the two-part
Committee Report because they specify "binding arbitration" and admit
of no Title VII exception.2m The Edwards memorandum (which was
196. Id. at H9526 (remarks of Rep. Edwards).
197. IaL at H9530.
198. IM.
199. See supra note 188.
200. Because general principles of contract interpretation determine the meaning of arbitration
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not before the Senate when it considered and passed S. 1745 a week
earlier) is inconsistent with section 118, the two-part Committee Report,
and the Dole and Hyde memoranda. Congressman Edwards suggests
that section 118 reaches only post-dispute arbitration agreements.P1
The section's text, however, yields no evidence of such a limitm By
specifying "agreement[s] ... in the context of a collective bargaining
agreement or in an employment contract," the two-part Committee
Report similarly supports no such limit.' Fimally, Congressman
Edwards' disavowal of Gilmer contradicts the Dole and Hyde memoran-
da, which had cited Gilmer with approval. 4
C. Analysis of the Recent Legislation's Arbitration Provisions
Where Congress grants a right to a judicial trial de novo following
arbitral resolution, the lawmakers would create an explicit exception to
the claim preclusion doctrine. To work this extraordinary result,
agreements, see, eg., Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler.Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614.
625-28 (1985), particular arbitration agreements would be enforceable only when (in the
memoranda's words) parties enter into them "knowingly and voluntarily." See supra note 194.
The knowing and voluntary nature of a particular arbitration agreement's execution would be* an
issue, if at all, only where the underlying claim is otherwise within the FAA mandate as a gen-
eral matter.
201. 137 CONG. REC. H9530 (1991).
202. Pub. L No. 102-166, § 118, 105 Stat. 1071, 1031 (1991).
203. See HR. REP. L at 97, H.R. REP. IL at 41, reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 635, 735.
204. See 137 CONG. REc. at S15,478, H9548 (1991).
205. Under claim preclusion rules, a valid and final arbitral award has the same effects. sub-
ject to the same exceptions and qualifications, as a judicial judgment. See REsTAT'IENr (SeC-
OND) OF JuGMENTS § 84 (1982). The general standard, however, does not apply where, as in
Alexander, a "scheme of remedies" permits relitigation of the subject claim. See id. at § 84(2)
& cmt. g (stating fact pattern similar to Alexander). Because preclusion is a common law doc-
trine, Congress may create exceptions to the doctrine. See, e.g., Benjamin v. Traffic Exec. Ass'n
E R.R., 869 F.2d 107, 113 n.9 (2d Cir. 1989); North Carolina v. United State 210 F. Supp.
675, 679 (I.D.N.C. 1962), rev'd on other grounds, 376 U.S. 93 (1964). Explicit congressionally
created exceptions appear rare indeed. See 18 CHARLES A. WIGHr Er AL., FEDERAL PRACriCE
AND PROCEDURE § 4403 n.20 (1981 & Supp. 1993).
A handful of congressional statutes grant the right to a judicial "trial de novo." These
statutes do not implicate claim preclusion rules, however, because they define only the method
by which aggrieved persons may secure otherwise available judicial review of adminismtaive
determinations. See, eg., 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (1988) (judicial review of Merit Systems Protection
Board decisions); 7 U.S.C. § 499g(c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (judicial review of reparation
order); 7 U.S.C. § 2023 (1988) (judicial review of denial of application of retail food store or
wholesale food concern to participate in federal food stamp program); 42 U.S.C. § 300e-9(e)(3)
(1988) (judicial review of assessment of civil penalty against employer which fails to comply
with statutory requirements for employee health benefit plans).
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Congress should speak forthrightly through textual directive rather than
obliquely through legislative history. Moreover, Congress should support
the result with a sound rationale grounded in relevant legal doctrine.
The ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act fail on both scores.
1. Post-Dispute Arbitration Agreements
Insofar as the texts of the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act
provide for FAA enforcement of post-dispute arbitration agreements,' °6
Congress acted prudently and in accordance with doctrine developed
over more than a generation.2°" In the aggregate, approximately ninety
Nor are claim preclusion rules implicated by the "trial de novo" granted in the experimen-
tal court-annexed arbitration project enacted by Title IX of the Judicial Improvements and Ac-
cess to Justice Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4659 (1988), codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 651-658 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). Title IX operates outside the FAA and is subject to a
five-year sunset provision. See id § 651(b). Title IX authorizes ten districts to order arbitration
of some actions without the parties' consent. 28 U.S.C. §§ 651(a), 652(a), 658(1). The Title
authorizes ten other districts to experiment with consensual arbitration only. Id. §§ 651(a),
652(a)(1)(A), 658(2). Following an award in non-consensual or consensual arbitration, any party
may demand a trial de novo in the district courL Id § 655. The arbitral award is entered as a
judgment of the court, however, only after expiration of the time for making the demand. Id. §
654(a).
206. See supra notes 159-67, 183-86 and accompanying text.
207. The FAA mandate creates a unitary standard for determining the enforceability of particu-
lar predispute or post-dispute arbitration agreements. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988) (agreements of either
category "shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract"). In determining whether claims under particular
federal statutes were within the mandate in the first place, however, Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S.
427 (1953), overruled by Rodriguez de Quijas v. Sherson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477 (1989).
and later decisions distinguished between predispute or post-dispute arbitration agreements.
The Wilko majority held that "an agreement to arbitrate a future controversy" ran afoul of
the antiwaiver provision of the Securities Act of 1933. 346 U.S. at 430. See also Rodriguez do
Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S. 477, 479 n.* (Wilko "carefully limited its holding" to
predispute arbitration agreements). In one sentence that did not cite authority, Justice Robert H.
Jackson's brief concurrence proceeded a step further, stating that the parties could have agreed
to arbitration after their dispute arose. 346 U.S. at 438 (Jackson, J., concurring).
Justice Jackson's statement came to enjoy broad application. In decisions denying en-
forcement of predispute arbitration agreements covering claims under the 1933 Act and various
other federal statutes, courts left post-dispute arbitration agreements unaffected. See, e.g.,
Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233 (1987) (citing decisions); American
Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 827 (2d Cir. 1968) (antitrust claims;
reserving decision on enforceability of agreements to arbitrate existing disputes); Reader v.
Hirsch & Co., 197 F. Supp. 111, 117 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (1934 Act claims; same).
From the dual premises that a person is not required to sue and that it may agree to settle
an existing claim, lower courts treated agreements to arbitrate an existing dispute as enforceable
agreements to have the dispute settled by a third party. See, e.g., Cobb v. Lewis, 488 F.2d 41,
47-49 (5th Cir. 1974) (antitrust claims); Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209,
1215 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972) (same); Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air
Preheater Co., 426 F.2d 980, 984 & n.8 (9th Cir. 1970) (same); Moran v. Paine Webber, Jack,
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percent of filed civil actions result in settlement rather than final judi-
cial adjudication. s The right to settle one's existing private claims
extends to claims under statutes touched by the ADA and the 1991
Civil Rights ActY° In a system that permits persons generally to set-
tle disputes without filing suit (or to settle suits without final judicial
resolution), no general policy reason exists for withdrawing the power
to agree to binding arbitration after a dispute arises. A post-dispute
arbitration agreement is tantamount to an agreement to allow a neutral
to play a role in settling the dispute. And despite imbalances in bar-
gaining position that might exist between the parties, Congress should
not withhold FAA enforcement of agreements to employ binding arbi-
tration in the otherwise available settlement process. 2t0
son & Curtis, 389 F.2d 242, 246 (3d Cir. 1968) (1934 Act claims). Courts also reasoned that
where the question is whether to agree to arbitrate an existing dispute, parties may act after
opportunity to assess the strengths of their respective positions, much as they otherwise would
in the settlement process. See, e.g., Coenen, 453 F.2d at 1215; Power Replacements, In.. 426
F.2d at 984 & n.8.
208. See, e.g., JoHN L COUND Er AL, CtIL PROCEDURs 1320 (6th ed. 1993); GERALD R.
WiLr.AMs, LEGAL NEoonxmroN AND S-rttmsENr 1 (1983); STEEN B. GoLDBEG Er A.,
DISPuE RESOLUTION 5 (1985); Marc Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We
Know and Don't Know (and Think We Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious
Society, 31 UCLA L REv. 4, 27-28 (1983); Carrie L Menkel-Meadow, Legal Negotiation: A
Study of Strategies in Search of a Theory, 1983 AI. B. FOuND. REs. J. 905. 905 & n.5
(1983).
209. See, e.g., Alexander, 415 U.S. at 52 n.15 ("In determining the effectiveness of (a] waiver
[of Title VII claims], a court would have to determine at the outset that the employee's consent
to the settlement was voluntary and knowing."); Stroman v. West Coast Grocery Co., 884 F.2d
458, 460-63 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 854 (1990) ("public policy favors voluntary
settlement of" Title VII claims, but courts "must closely scrutinize a waiver of rights un&-r
Title VII because of their remedial nature"); Coventry v. U.S. Steel Corp., 856 F.2d 514, 521-
25 (3d Cir. 1988) (person may settle ADEA claims provided that, under the totality of the
circumstances, the person makes the settlement agreement knowingly and voluntarily); Moore v.
McGraw Edison Co., 804 F.2d 1026, 1033 (8th Cr. 1986) (ADEA claims); Rogers v. General
Elec. Co., 781 F.2d 452, 454-56 (5th Cir. 1986) (Tide VII claims; citing decisions); Runyan v.
National Cash Register Corp., 787 F.2d 1039, 1041-45 & n.10 (6th Cir.) (en bane). cert. denied,
479 U.S. 850 (1986) (person may waive ADEA claims provided waiver is knowing and volun-
tary under ordinary contract principles); Pilon v. University of lmn., 710 F.2d 466 (8th Cir.
1983) (Title VII claims); 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (Supp. IV 1992) (powers, remedies, and procedures
set forth in Title VII are the powers, remedies, and procedures granted to persons alleging ADA
violation). The right to settle ADEA claims is now subject to the Older Workers Benefit Protec-
tion Act of 1990, whose waiver provisions are discussed supra note 187.
210. Where parties execute a post-dispute arbitration agreement as part of an "dministtve
agency's alternative dispute resolution process, constitutional constraints may permit only a form
of non-binding award. The constitutional issue may arise in connection with the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988, Pub. L No. 100-430, 102 Stat. 1619 (1938) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3601-3619 (1988)), which amended Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1963, Pub. L No.
90-284, 82 Stat. 73 (1968) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)). As
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amended, the 1968 Act authorizes aggrieved persons, within a year after an alleged discrimi-
natory housing practice has occurred or terminated, to file a complaint with the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) alleging the practice. 42 U.S.C. § 3610(a)(l)(A)(i)
(1988). See also id. § 3602(0 (defining "discriminatory housing practice"). The Act also autho-
rizes the Secretary to file such a complaint on his or her own initiative. Id. The Act reaches
practices in the sale or rental of housing, in residential real-estate related transactions, and in
the provision of brokerage services. Id. §§ 3604-3606. The Act prohibits discrimination because
of race, color, religion, sex, handicap, familial status or national origin. Id.
Before filing a charge or dismissing a complaint following investigation, the Secretary
must, to the extent feasible, seek to resolve the complaint through conciliation. Id. § 3610(b)(1).
If conciliation is successful, the complainant and respondent execute a written conciliation agree-
ment. See id. § 3610(b)(2); 24 C.F.R. § 103.310 (1992). The conciliation agreement precludes
the aggrieved person from filing a civil action alleging the discriminatory housing practice that
formed the basis of the complaint, except to enforce the agreement itself. 42 U.S.C. §
3613(a)(2) (1988). The conciliation agreement "may provide for binding arbitration of the dis-
pute arising from the complaint."' I § 3610(b)(3). Regardless of any prior agreement the parties
might have had, any such arbitration agreement would obviously qualify as a post-dispute agree-
ment. In an arbitration that "results from" a conciliation agreement, id. § 3610(b)(3), the arbitra-
tor may award "appropriate relief, including monetary relief." Id. The Act specifies that the
conciliation agreement, including the arbitration agreement, is subject to the Secretary's approval.
Id. § 3610(b)(2).
By its terms, the 1988 Act does not require the Secretary's approval of the arbitral award.
Neither the Act's legislative history, nor HUD's implementing rules, amplifies on the nature of
fair-housing arbitration awards. See H.R. REP. No. 711, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 34 (1988), re-
printed in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2173, 2195 (discussing HUD fair-housing arbifration process); 24
C.F.R. §§ 103.310, 103.315 (1992).
Shortly after the 1988 Act authorized fair-housing arbitration, Congress enacted the Admin-
istrative Dispute Resolution Act of 1990. Pub. L. No. 101-552, 104 Stat. 2736 (1990). Among
other things, the 1990 Act authorizes federal agencies to resolve disputes by arbitration and
other alternative means, and establishes a framework for agency exercise of this authority. See
S. REP. No. 543, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 1-2 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3931-32.
The 1990 Act does not impose requirements on HUD's fair-housing arbitration because the au-
thorization and framework do not replace or limit alternative dispute resolution mechanisms an
agency previously employed. See 5 U.S.C. § 582(c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992); S. REP,. No. 543,
101st Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1990). reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3931. Section 590 of the 1990
Act, however, reflects concerns about whether binding arbitration in the administrative context
would pass muster under the Federal Constitution.
During deliberations that produced the 1990 Act, the House Judiciary Committee pin-
pointed four constitutional concerns with binding administrative arbitration-that Article II's
Appointments Clause might be offended by appointment of arbitrators who are not federal em-
ployees, that the separation of powers doctrine might be offended by congressional authorization
of private persons to perform agency decisionmaking powers, that Article IMl might be offended
by removing responsibility and authority from the federal courts, and that due process might be
offended by binding arbitration in the administrative context. See S. REP. No. 543, 101st Cong.,
2d Sass. 5 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3931, 3935. See generally Harold H. Bruff,
Public Programs, Private Deciders: The Constitutionality of Arbitration in Federal Programs, 67
TEX. L. REV. 441 (1989).
In an effort to satisfy constitutional constraints, § 590 of the 1990 Act limits the binding
effect of arbitral awards made under its procedures. The section provides that an award does not
become final until thirty days after its service on the parties, and authorizes the agency to va-
cate the award before it becomes final. 5 U.S.C. § 590(b), (c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992). By
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Under the statutes touched by the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights
Act, however, some claims might implicate the public interest in a
manner that makes judicial resolution desirable. To this end, Congress
has created an administrative process which protects the public interest
while also preserving the general enforceability of post-dispute arbitra-
tion agreements. Arbitration (like private settlement) does not diminish
a party's right to file with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC) a charge which, based on the circumstances that are the
subject of the arbitration, alleges violation of one or more of the stat-
utes.21 Nor does arbitration diminish the EEOC's authority, under the
statutes, to bring an enforcement action on a filed charge or on its own
initiative.?
12
2. Predispute Arbitration Agreements
Insofar as the texts of the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act
provide for FAA enforcement of Predispute arbitration agreements," 3
Congress advanced the policy goals underlying the four statutes touched
by the Acts. The lingering difficulty lies not in this provision, but in
the fact that Congress left the job unfinished. While approving FAA en-
forcement, the lawmakers avoided textual treatment of protective qualifi-
thus providing that arbitral awards are "in effect, 'non.binding'" for the thirty-day period, Con-
gress sought to insure that federal officers, and not outside panics, would be ultimately respon-
sible for such awards. See S. REP. No. 543. 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1990). reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3931, 3936-37. HUD's statutory authorization provides for no such postpone-
ment of finality in fair-housing arbitration.
211. See, e.g., Alexander, 415 U.S. at 42-43 (following arbitral award, claimant filed charge
with EEOC. which found lack of reasonable cause to believe a Title VII violation M occurred
and notified claimant of his right to institute a civil action); Gilmer, III S. CL 1647, 1653
("An individual ADEA claimant subject to an arbitration agreement will. still bz frea to file a
charge with the EEOC, even though the claimant is not able to institute a private judicial ac-
tion."); 42 U.S.C.A. § 12117 (Supp. 1993) (T1itle VII powers, rem:dis and procedures are
powers, remedies, and procedures for enforcing ADA).
212. Concerning Title VII, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-5(b), (f) (1981 & Supp. 1993); EEOC v.
Quick Shop Mts., Inc., 396 F. Supp. 133. 136 (E.D. Mo.) (dictum), affd on other grozndr,
526 F.2d 802 (8th Cir. 1975). Concerning the ADA, see 42 U.S.C.A. § 12117 (Supp. 1993)
(Title VII powers, remedies and procedures are powers, remedies and procedures for enforcing
ADA). Concerning the ADEA, see 29 U.S.C. § 626(c)(1) (1988); Isaacs v. Caterpillar, Inc., 765
F. Supp. 1359, 1371 (C.D. Ill. 1991).
Outside the civil rights context, maintenance of agency jurisdiction underlay the 1934 legis-
lation which provides for FAA enforcement of arbitration agreements covering patent interferenc:
claims. The legislation preserved the authority of the Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks
to determine the patentability of inventions involved in particular arbitrated interferen claims.
See supra text accompanying notes 83-86.
213. See supra notes 159-67, 183-85 and accompanying text.
19941
HeinOnline  -- 26 Conn. L. Rev. 563 1993-1994
CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW
cations on the otherwise binding effect of arbitral awards on claims
under the statutes. The lawmakers' avoidance requires amendment of
both the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
Where the FAA mandate remains applicable to post-dispute arbitra-
tion agreements covering claims under a particular statute, Congress
should not preclude FAA enforcement of predispute arbitration agree-
ments based on the first ground raised in Gilmer, the importance of the
statute's underlying policy goals." 4 Arbitration's effect on these goals
remains constant regardless of the timing of the arbitration agreement's
execution. As in circumstances marked by enforcement of post-dispute
agreements, the administrative process safeguards the public interest in
resolution of particular disputes under the statutes touched by the ADA
and the 1991 Civil Rights Act.2
15
With respect to claims under a particular statute, Congress might
consider precluding FAA enforcement of predispute arbitration
agreements based on another ground raised in Gilmer, the relative bar-
gaining positions parties often occupy.2 16 Predispute arbitration agree-
ments are sometimes seen to hold potential for unfairness because they
frequently result from relationships marked by unequal bargaining pow-
er at a time when neither party enjoys the alternative of commencing a
judicial action. The party in the stronger position (for example, a secu-
rities brokerage firm or an employer) can effectively insist on an arbi-
tration agreement that waives a judicial forum. The agreement may
appear in a form contract presented by that party. The party in the
weaker position (for example, a prospective securities customer or a
prospective employee) may feel unable to negotiate the agreement's
removal without jeopardizing the incipient relationship. Indeed, in the
absence of an actual dispute, the weaker party may be inexperienced
and thus unable to appreciate the agreement's potential effect.
When a dispute implicating statutory claims does arise, the stronger
party frequently is also a "regulated person," a member of the class
whose alleged conduct the statute proscribes. The weaker party fre-
quently is also a "protected person," a member of the class granted the
private right of action. Enforcement of predispute arbitration agreements
thus may enable regulated persons to deprive protected persons of op-
portunity for judicial redress of claims under remedial statutes.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 141-48.
215. See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
216. See supra text accompanying notes 154-56.
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Gilmer reaffirmed that courts may not withhold FAA enforcement
of predispute arbitration agreements for mere inequality of bargaining
power. The Court observed that McMahon and Rodriguez had upheld
the general enforceability of such agreements in the securities brokerage
context notwithstanding the unequal bargaining positions which would
normally characterize the relationship between customer and brokerage
firm.2" To vitiate a particular arbitration agreement based on relative
bargaining position, a court must find "such grounds as exist at law or
in equity for the revocation of any contract."2"' One such ground is
the unconscionability doctrine.219 Because courts regularly uphold en-
forcement of predispute arbitration agreements in form contracts be-
tween parties of apparently unequal bargaining power,2 however, the
doctrine offers relief from the FAA mandate only in extraordinary cir-
cumstances.
The relative-bargaining-position coin has a second side which helps
explain why, in the absence of unconscionability, FAA enforcement of
predispute arbitration agreements is consistent with the policy goals of
the four statutes touched by the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
Provided that extant arbitral procedures otherwise afford opportunity for
a fair hearing, a predispute arbitration agreement affords prospective
protection to the weaker party by assuring access to a neutral forum de-
signed to diminish the influence of delay and expense. Because of
217. 111 S. Ct. 1647, 1655.
218. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1988), quoted supra note 6. See also Gilmer. 111 S. CL 1647, 1656 ("Of
course, courts should remain attuned to well supported claims that the agreement to arbitrate
resulted from the sort of fraud or overwhelming economic power that would provide grounds
'for the revocation of any contract.") (quoting Mitsubishi. 473 US. at 627).
219. See RESTATMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
220. Se4 e.g., Dullard v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 961 F.2d 1148, 1154-55
(5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1046 (1993) (enforcing predispute arbitration provision
in securities brokerage agreement between individual investor and securities brokerage firm);
Adams v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 888 F.2d 696, 700-01 (10th Cir. 1989)
(same); Driscoll v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 815 F.2d 655, 65859 (lth Cir.).
vacated and remanded for further consideration in light of Mlahon, 484 U.S. 909 (1987).
aft'd on remand sub nom. Adrian v. Smith Barney, Harris, Upham & Co., 841 F.2d 1059 (lth
Cir. 1988) (same; provision did not demonstrate lack of meaningful choice and was not inher-
ently unfair or oppressive); Webb v. R. Rowland & Co., 800 F.2d 803, 807 (Sth Cir. 1986)
(same; "The use of a standard form contract between two parties of admittedly unequal bar-
gaining power does not invalidate an otherwise valid contractual provision. To be invalid, th
provision at issue must be unconscionable.").
If unconscionability is asserted with respect to the arbitration provision itself, the issue is
for the court to resolve; if unconscionability is asserted with respect to the contract as a whole,
the issue is resolved in arbitration. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Corp, 388
U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967).
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persistent docket delays, final judicial decision in a civil action may
take several years."2 In the absence of a predispute arbitration agree-
221. Title VII instructs the court "to assign the case for hearing at the earliest practicable date
and to cause the case to be in every way expedited:' 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(tJ(5) (1988). Judges
and commentators, however, have consistently reported the delays inherent in final judicial reso-
lution of Title VII claims. See, e.g., Betty B. Fletcher, Arbitration of Title VII Claims: Some
Judicial Perceptions in Arbitration Issues for the 1980s: PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FOURTH
ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARBITRATORS 218, 220 (1982) ("A litigated Title
VII action frequently consumes three years or more, first in the EEOC's efforts to conciliate,
then in the process of discovery and trial .... [O]ur court (the Ninth Circuit) is currently
considering acts of discrimination which occurred many years ago."); Lewis B. Kaden, Judges
and Arbitrators: Observations on the Scope of Judicial Review, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 284
(1980) (discussing "the outrageous delays . ..of title VII procedures"); Winn Newman, Post
Gardner-Denver Developments in the Arbitration of Discrimination Claims, in ARBITRATION-
1975: PROCEEDINGS OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF ARmI-
TRATOR 36, 41 (1976) (discussing "the delay of three or four years from the date of filing an
EEOC charge before trial date is set in most federal courts").
Because of growing pressures on federal dockets, delays in judicial resolution of Title VII
and other civil claims are likely to persist and lengthen in the foreseeable future. A significant
reason is that in the past few years, the federal courts have been inundated with criminal cases
charging drug-related violations. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITIHE
6, 36, 160 (1990) ("the expanded federal effort to reduce drug trafficking has led to a recent
surge in federal criminal trials that is preventing federal judges in major metropolitan areas from
scheduling civil trials, especially civil jury trials, of which there is now a rapidly growing back-
log:' providing statistics; "Rapid expansion of the federal criminal caseload caused by drug
prosecutions threatens to overwhelm the resources of the federal courts:). See also, e.g., Ste-
phen Labaton, U.S. Judges Refuse To Add Civil Cases, Citing Gap in Funds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
9, 1993, at Al; Michael deCourcy Hinds, Bush's Aides Push Gun-Related Cases on Federal
Courts, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1991, at Al, B16 ("Federal judges . . . are alarmed that their
dockets are increasingly filled by cases involving drugs and guns, while important constitutional
issues like civil rights . . .actions await hearings for months or years"; "civil cases are slipping
farther and farther down the Federal court docket" and federal courts' "backlogs are growing,"
in significant part because the number of drug cases increased five-fold from 1980 to 1990,
while the number of district judges increased by only about 10%); Stephen Labaton, New Tac-
tics in the War on Drugs Tilt Scales of Justice Off Balance, N.Y. TIME, Dec. 294 1989, at Al
("Drug cases are dominating already overcrowded dockets, and . . . tens of thousands of civil
lawsuits ... are being pushed aside and subjected to enormous delays as a result"; surge in
drug-related prosecutions is "leading to unprecedented delays in Federal courts for civil litigants
who are seeking to resolve . . . civil rights actions .... "). The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18
U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), produces delays in commencement of civil trials
by requiring that a criminal defendant in federal court be given a trial within seventy days of
indictmefit or information. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITrEB,
supra at 6, 36 (discussing Speedy Trial Act's effect on federal civil docket).
In the civil rights context, analogy to securities arbitration may have limits. Still, a 1992
United States General Accounting Office empirical study of securities arbitration indicates
arbitration's relative swiftness. See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFCM, SECURITIES
ARBITRATION: How INvESTORS FARE (1992) ("GAO Study"), discussed infra text accompanying
notes 228-34. The GAO Study found that the average time to process a decided case at arbitra-
tion forums sponsored by the securities industry was 383 days, compared to 378 days for a
settled case. The average processing time for a decided case at American Arbitration Association
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ment, the parties could agree to arbitration after the dispute arises, or
could otherwise settle the dispute at that time. But the stronger party
might also use its presumably superior position to insist on litigation.
Through such tactical maneuvering as motion practice and extensive
discovery, that party might then make judicial resolution so expensive
that the weaker party would be faced with the prospect of capitulating
or reaching a disadvantageous settlement regardless of its perceptions of
the merits.
Where Congress contemplates creating an exception to the FAA
mandate, then, the determinative question is whether arbitration provides
a fair process for resolving claims under the statute in question. Proce-
dural adequacy, the third ground raised in Gilmer, remains a matter
debated by courts and commentators alike. On and off the bench, voic-
es throughout the past several decades have lauded arbitration's general
capacity to resolve disputes with relative swiftness and economy that
assertedly eludes civil litigation tm' Similar voices, however, correctly
was 349 days, compared to 334 days for a settled case. d at 44. "Processing time" began
when the forum received the investor's claim; it ended when the forum sent the arbitrators'
decision to the investor or when the forum received notice of settlement terms. I&
Other empirical studies indicate that except perhaps in some particularly large or complex
cases, arbitration is indeed generally swifter and more economical than litigation. See, eg., Her-
bert M. Kritzer & Jilt K. Anderson, The Arbitration Alternative: A Comparative Analysis of
Case Processing Time, Disposition Mode, and Cost in the American Arbitration Association and
the Courts. 8 JUST. SYS. J. 6, 18 (1983); Thomas J. Stipanowich, Rethinking American Arbitra-
tion, 63 IND. L.J 425, 453-54. 460-62, 473-77 (1988) (discussing empirical studies).
222. The Senate and House reports accompanying the FAA emphasized arbitration's capacity
for producing relatively swift, economical dispute resolution. See H.R. REP. No. 96, 63th Cong.,
Ist Sess. 1-2 (1924); S. REP. No. 536, 68th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1924). Similar emphasis came
from other contemporary voices, including ones which helped influence the FAA's enactment.
See, eg., ABA Committee, supra note 19, at 155 (arbitration seeks to avoid the "delay incident
to a proceeding in our courts, which, in centers of commercial ctity ... frequently
amounts to several years"); Cohen & Dayton, supra note 19, at 265-66 (1926) (discussing "the
unfortunate congestion of the courts and ... the delay, expense and technicality of litigation";
arbitration statutes are "the direct outcome of... the necessity for som remedy which will
cut the Gordian knot of the law's delay"): Richard C. Curtis, A Comparison of the Recent
Arbitration Statutes, 13 A.B.A. J. 567-68 (1927) ("the greatest advantage of commercial arbitra-
tion over a law suit is speed"); see also Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., lnc 450
U.S. 728, 747 (1981) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) ("The reasons for favoring arbitration are as wise
as they are obvious: litigation is costly and time consuming.. ."); Weissbuch v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 558 F.2d 831, 833 (7th Cir. 1977) (discussing "strong
national policy favoring" arbitration "as a means of resolving private conflicts short of the more
costly and disruptive avenue of litigation"); Federal Commerce & Navigation Co. v. Kanematsu-
Gosho, Ltd., 457 F.2d 387, 389 (2d Cir. 1972) (discussing "the basic purposes of arbitration: to
resolve disputes speedily and to avoid the expense and delay of extended court proceedings");
Wlko v. Swan, 201 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir.) (discussing the "speedy remedy of arbitration" and
the "long delayed remedy of trial in the courts"), rev'd on other grounds, 346 U.S. 427, 431
1994]
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assert that expedition is not the sole virtue. At least where arbitration is
contemplated pursuant to predispute agreement, these voices question
arbitration's capacity to serve as a substitute for the judicial process in
vindicating the rights of persons within a statute's protected class.m
A particular concern is the general inability of courts to police the
potential for arbitrator bias against such protected persons. Arbitrators
are encouraged to adhere to a Code of Ethics designed to produce
honesty and impartiality. 4  Arbitration rules enable parties to object
to proposed neutral arbitrators whose circumstances appear likely to af-
fect impartiality, including bias, financial or personal interest, or any
past or present relationship with a party or its representatives,2 Com-
mercial arbitrators, however, normally do not write opinions or other-
wise reveal the findings and conclusions that produced the award. 6
In the absence of a written opinion, awards ordinarily evade meaningful
judicial review because the FAA permits vacatur only when the arbitra-
tor has engaged in gross impropriety or where the award, on its face,
demonstrates manifest disregard of the applicable law.? In the pre-
(1953) (FAA establishes "desirability of arbitration as an alternative to the complications of lit-
igation"), overruled on other grounds, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, 490 U.S.
477 (1989); Warren E. Burger, Isn't There a Better Way?, 68 A.B.A. J. 274 (1982); Warren E.
Burger, Reflections on the Adversary System, 27 VA.. U. L. REv. 309, 310-11 (1993); Talbot
D'Alemberte, ABA Officer: ADR Has Come Into Its Own, ARB. J., Mar. 1991, at 3, 60; Thomas
D. Lambros, The Summary Jury Trial and Other Alternative Methods of Dispute Resolution, 103
F.R.D. 461, 465 (1985); Saundra Torry, Quayle and Bush Administration Take on Civil Justice
Reform, WASH. POST, Feb. 3, 1992, at F5.
223. See, e.g., Gilimer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., III S. Ct. 1647, 166-61 (1991)
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (discussing arbitration's effect on persons protected by the ADEA; ma-
jority "clearly eviscerates the important role played by an independent judiciary in eradicating
employment discrimination"); McMahon v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 482 U.S. 220, 251
(1987) (Blackmnun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing 1933 Act policies;
Act "had as its main goal investor protection, which took took the form of an effort to place
investors on an equal footing with those in the securities industry . . . "); Richard E. Speidel,
Arbitration of Statutory Rights Under the Federal Arbitration Act: The Case for Reform, 4 OHIO
ST. J. ON DIsp. RESOL 157, 205-06 (1989).
224. See AMERICAN BAR ASS'N - AM. ARB. ASS'N, CODE OF ETHICS FOR ARBITRATORS IN
COMMERCIAL DISPuTES (1977). The Code's use is not limited to AAA arbitrations or to arbitra-
tors who are lawyers, but rather seeks to "provide guidance in all types of commercial arbitra-
tion." See id. at 4; see also AMERICAN ARB. ASS'N, CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSmLITY
FOR ARBITRATORS OF LABOR-MANAGEMENT DISPUTES (1974).
225. See, e.g., AAA COMMERCIAL ARB. RULE 19 (eff. May 1, 1992); AAA EMPLOYMENT
DIsPUTE RESOLUTION RULES 8, 9 (eff. Jan. 1, 1993).
226. See. e.g., AAA COMMERCIAL ARB. RULE 42 (eff. May 1, 1992); AAA EMPLOYMENT
DISPUTE RESOLUTION RULE 29(b) (eff. Jan. 1, 1993).
227. Section 10(a) of the FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 10(a) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992), provides that the
court may vacate a final arbitral award:
[Vol. 26:521
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ponderance of cases, the arbitrator is effectively the final decisionmaker,
shielded from close judicial scrutiny.
Recent empirical data demonstrates support for the proposition that
extant arbitral procedures do afford opportunity for a fair hearing. In a
study of the securities arbitration process' by the United States Gen-
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means.
(2) Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them.
(3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone the hear-
ing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent and mate-
rial to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights of any party
have been prejudiced.
(4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that
a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
Dictum in Wilko discussed judicial vacatur of final arbitral awards which are in "tmanifest
disregard" of the applicable law. 346 U.S. at 436-37 ("In unrestricted submissions,... the in-
terpretatiors of the law by the arbitrators in contrast to manifest disregard am not subject, in
the federal courts, to judicial review for error in interpretation.") (citations omitted). Most cir-
cuits have recognized the judicially created manifest-disregard ground for vacatur. Recognition
has survived Wiko's overruling in Rodriguez. See, e.g., Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v.
Weiss, 989 F.2d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 1993) (to vacate for manifest disegard, court must find that
arbitrators knew of a governing legal principle, yet refused to apply it or ignored it altogethe,
the principle must be well defined, explicit, and clearly applicable); Lee v. Chica, 983 F.2d 883,
885 (8th Cir. 1993); Health Servs. Management Corp. v. Hughes, 975 F.2d 1253. 1267 (7th Cir.
1992); A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. McCollough, 967 F.2d 1401, 1403 (9th Cir. 1992), cert.
denied, 113 S. CL 970 (1993); Kanuth v. Prescott, Ball & Turb-n Inc., 949 F.2d 1175, 1178-
79, 1182 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6, 8-11 & n.5 (1st Cir. 1990);
Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. J.V.B. Indus., Inc., 894 F.2d 862, 866 (6th Cir. 1990). A few
circuits have declined to apply Wiko's dictum. See, e.g., McIlmy v. Paine Webber, Inc., 959
F.2d 817, 820 & n.2 (5th Cir. 1993); Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679. 684 (11th Cir. 1992).
cert. denied, 113 S. CL 201 (1992).
The various grounds for judicial vacatur of final arbitral awads have aptly been described
as "severely limited." Edward Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights, 71 N.C. L REV.
81, 86-87 (1992).
228. In at least one significant respect, securities arbitration provides a particularly instructive
setting for empirical study of arbitral fairness. Ever since McMahon and Rodriguez. most cus-
tomer-broker securities disputes have gone to arbitration pursuant to predispute arbitration agree-
ments in brokerage contracts. These agreements normally require arbitration under the auspices
of a securities industry forum (usually the New York Stock Exchange or the National Associa-
tion of Securities Dealers), rather than under the auspices of an independent organization such
as the American Arbitration Association. See GAO Study, supra note 221, at 15. 31-32. In
1990 the NYSE and NASD together processed 94% of disputes filed for arbitration in securities
industry forums. Id at 23. The securities industry faced strident criticism that arbitration at
industry-sponsored forums was infected with pro-industry bias. See, e.g., Mary Kuntz. Ruling:
You Can't Take Broker to Court, NEWSDAY, May 16, 1989, at 45 ("the deck is still stacked in
favor of the brokerage"); Beth M. Gilbert et aL, How Investors Can Avoid the Bind of Binding
Arbitration, MONEY, Sept. 1988, at 27 ("Imagine buying a car, having engine trouble and then
reading in your sales contract that you are forced to go to the Car Dealers Association of
America to resolve your grievance.") (quoting Rep. Edward J. Markey).
19941
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eral Accounting Office ("GAO")," researchers found "no indication
of a pro-industry bias in decisions at industry-sponsored forums. 2' 0
Indeed, the GAO reported that in cases in which individual investors
filed claims against broker-dealers, arbitrators decided in favor of the
investor in a combined average of about 59 percent of the cases heard
under securities industry auspices and in about 60 percent of the cases
heard under American Arbitration Association auspices.2' The
amounts awarded averaged about 60 percent of the amount claimed.22
The GAO did not attempt to evaluate the substantive outcomes
reached in the particular arbitrations studied, that is, to analyze and
judge the merits of the facts presented and the reasoning that produced
the award. 3 The GAO concluded that it could not compare litigation
and arbitration results during the subject period because of "the limited
number of retail investor cases decided through litigation and the inher-
ent differences between the processes."' Nonetheless, the sizeable
percentages of arbitrations won by individual investors offer persuasive
basis for alleviating fears that ordinarily weaker parties suffer bias in
arbitrations pursuant to predispute agreement.
In the context of claims under civil rights statutes such as the ADA
and the 1991 Civil Rights Act, however, analysis does not end with
conclusions about protections that predispute arbitration agreements
afford to members of the statute's protected class. Nor does analysis
end with conclusions relating to the fairness of arbitral procedure. Be-
cause of the unique protective purposes of civil rights legislation, Con-
gress must place qualifications on the otherwise binding effect of FAA
awards on statutory civil rights claims. In both the ADA and the 1991
Civil Rights Act, the existing statutory arbitration provisions fail to
provide adequate protection to potential claimants.
229. See GAO Study, supra note 221. The GAO released its study in May of 1992. The
study analyzed nearly 4,000 disputes between individual investors and broker-dealers which were
decided in arbitration between January 1, 1989 and June 30, 1990. GAO Study, supra note 221,
at 23-25. The GAO designed procedures to provide a 95% confidence level that the results
would represent industrywide practice with a sampling error of plus or minus 5%. Id. at 21.
230. GAO Study, supra note 221, at 6.
231. GAO Study, supra note 221, at 38. In arbitrations initiated by broker-dealers, the
arbitrators' decisions usually favored the broker-dealer because the arbitration usually involved
"well-documented investors' debt to the broker-dealer." Id. at 35, 41.
232. GAO Study, supra note 221, at 7.
233. GAO Study, supra note 221, at 6.
234. GAO Study, supra note 221, at 6, 26, 35.
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IV. THE NEED FOR AMENDMh T
The ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act authorize arbitration in the
statutory texts but suggest qualifications on the binding effect of arbitral
awards only in the legislative histories. The reasoning found in the
legislative histories themselves is seriously flawed. By assuming this ap-
proach, Congress has damaged the causes of civil rights legislation and
of arbitration.
This Part explores the sources of Congress' error and concludes
with suggestions about how Congress should amend the Acts to remedy
the deficiencies.
A. The Sources of the Error
1. Congress's Unfortunate Reliance on Legislative History
As a threshold matter, the committee reports accompanying the
ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act discuss qualifications in virtually
identical passages. The similarity of the passages suggests that in
determining the arbitrability of civil rights causes, Congress has grown
satisfied with the use of boilerplate. Because of the protective purposes
underlying the four statutes touched by the acts, any such satisfaction
would be disquieting. Resort to boilerplate in legislative history dimin-
ishes respect for arbitration by suggesting a congressional style marked
by inability or unwillingness to articulate fundamental policy choices.
Boilerplate leaves the unfortunate impression that Congress has not
analyzed tensions that may exist between binding arbitration and the
goals and purposes of the affected civil rights statutes.
In three respects, however, the likely damage transcends matters of
style. First, the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act invite judicial
enforcement of arbitration agreements without enforcement of qualifica-
tions which, if the legislative histories serve as any barometer at all,
many lawmakers evidently considered important indicia of fairness.
Second, Congress has invited the unseemly prospect that two apparently
identical textual expressions of "encouragement" for binding arbitration,
enacted only one year apart, might receive disparate judicial treatment
235. See H.R. REP. No. 485(). 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1990). reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 499 (ADA); MR. R.-'. No. 40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 97 (1991) (1991
Civil Rights Act); IR. REP. No. 40(), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 41 (1991) (sare). The "discus-
sions of qualifications in the 1991 Civil Rights Act reports are reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N.
635. 735 respectively. See also supra text accompanying notes 168-76, 187-91.
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because of the largely fortuitous courses of debate and consideration.
Finally, the legal effect of the would-be qualifications is likely to be
the subject of contentious litigation even though Congress could have
resolved the issue by forthright consideration and textual treatment.
"In determining the scope of a statute," the Supreme Court states,
"we look first to its language. If the statutory language is unambiguous,
in the absence of 'a clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary,
that language must ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.' ',13 6 Because
the Judiciary Committee and Conference reports speak in unison con-
cerning the meaning of section 513 of the ADA, 7 the reports might
well qualify as a clear expression of intent contrary to the section's
unqualified expression of encouragement (and hence of permission) for
binding arbitration. The claimant's right to a judicial trial de novo,
addressed in the reports,"8 thus might survive otherwise binding arbi-
tral awards on ADA claims.
However, because the legislative history of section 118 of the
1991 Civil Rights Act lacks any semblance of the unison that charac-
terized the legislative history of section 513," 9 courts might accord
section 118's textual expression of encouragement an effect markedly
different from the effect accorded the ADA counterpart. Whatever else
might be said about the 1991 Civil Rights Act's legislative history
concerning arbitrability, that history cannot be said to constitute a
"clearly expressed" congressional intent.
In light of the discordance that marks consideration of arbitrability
in the 1991 Civil Rights Act's legislative history, the most sensible
interpretation may be that section 118 expresses uncontradicted congres-
sional intent to permit binding arbitration of claims under the ADA,
Title VII, the Civil Rights Act of 1866, and the ADEA. The section
appears unambiguous in authorizing binding arbitration, and the legisla-
tive history is ineffective in expressing an enforceable contrary in-
tent.'
Because of the uncertainty that inevitably attends judicial interpreta-
tion of legislative history, confusion about the effects of the respective
legislative histories will likely persist pending case law development
236. See, e.g., Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. Ct. 1163, 1169 (1993) (citing decisions).
237. See supra notes 168-76 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 170-76.
239. See supra notes 187-204 and accompanying text.
240. In decisions handed down after the 1991 Civil Rights Act's effective date, courts have
found Title VII claims arbitrable. See infra note 247.
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HeinOnline  -- 26 Conn. L. Rev. 572 1993-1994
ARBITRABILITY IN CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
under the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act. 41 The need for judi-
cial resolution would produce uncertainty, delay and expense which are
inconsistent with arbitration's mission to provide relatively swift, effi-
cient dispute resolution.
Unless Congress clarifies its own intent by textual amendments to
the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the need for judicial resolution
also invites a spate of bad law, which may already have begun. In
Hillding v. McDonnell Douglas Helicopter Co.,242 the terminated fe-
male employee agreed to arbitration by an ad hoc committee of five
persons chosen by her and the employer. The committee unanimously
upheld the termination.
The federal district court held that the arbitral award did not bar the
plaintiff from filing suit alleging that the defendant employer had en-
gaged in gender discrimination in violation of Title VII. The court
correctly stated that Gilmer had concerned only the arbitrability of
particular statutory claims under the FAA, and not the preclusive effect
of final arbitral awards. But the court then held that because the ad hoc
committee's decision was "essentially a contractual one," Alexander v.
Gardner-Denver Co. and its progeny assured an opportunity to seek
judicial redress of the Title VII claims.4 3
The difficulty is that Gilmer had distinguished the Alexander trio on
grounds which apply not only to arbitrability but also to claim preclu-
sion. First, Gilmer stated that the trio concerned not the enforceability
of arbitration agreements covering statutory claims, but the "quite dif-
ferent issue" whether arbitration of contract-based claims precluded later
241. The confusion has been compounded. At least three Justices have been critical of the
Court's current approach to statutory interpretation. arguing that legislative history should not
affect the interpretation of statutes whose textual meaning appears clear. See. e.g., Darby v.
Cisneros, 113 S. CL 2539, 2540 n.* (1993) (Relnquist, CJ., Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joining
majority opinion, except part which concluded that legislative history supported meaning which
majority had earlier found plain in the statutory text); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 113 S. CL 1562,
1572 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring) C(The language of the statute is entirely clear, and if that is
not what Congress meant then Congress has made a mistake and Congress will have to correct
it. We should not pretend to care about legislative intent (as opposed to th meaning of the
law) . .. ."); id. at 1563 n.*, 1566 n.12 (Justice Thomas not joining in majority's footnote that
criticized Justice Scalia's rejection of legislative history); Reves v. Ernst & Young, 113 S. CL
1163, 1166 n.1 (1993) (Scalia and Thomas, JJ., joining majority opinion. except part which
concluded that legislative history supported meaning which majority had earlier found in the
statutory text). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., 'he New Textualism. 37 UCLA L REV.
621, 650-56 (1990) (discussing Justice Scalia's criticism and citing his opinions in which the
criticism appears).
242. No. CIV 91-1079, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17216 (D. Ariz. June 9. 1992).
243. Id. at *8.
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judicial resolution of statutory claims.' Second, Gilmer stated that in
Alexander and its progeny, the arbitration was pursuant to collective-
bargaining agreements with claimants represented by their unions; the
Court reasoned that the "tension" between collective representation and
individual statutory rights is absent in FAA arbitration, where claimants
conduct their own individual representation. 5 Finally, Gilmer stated
that the Alexander trio were not decided under the FAA.246
Hiliding concerned the preclusive effect of a final award in an FAA
arbitration in which the plaintiff raised, or could have raised, the Title
VII claims when she conducted her own individual representation. Be-
cause of Gilmer's distinctions, then, Alexander does not provide support
for the result the district court reached on the claim preclusion issue.
Perhaps Hillding strained to afford the plaintiff an opportunity to pursue
her Title VII claims in court. The opportunity would have a firmer
foundation if Congress, rather than tantalize claimants and courts in
legislative history, would amend the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights
Act to guarantee such opportunities in the statutory texts.247
244. 111 S. Ct. at 1657.
245. Il
246. Ia
247. In other decisions handed down after enactment of the 1991 Civil Rights Act, courts
have found Title VII claims arbitrable. but without discussing a right to file a post-arbitral suit
on such claims. See, e.g., Bender v. A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc., 971 F.2d 698, 699-700 (11th
Cir. 1992); Mago v. Shearson Lehman Hutton Inc., 956 F.2d 932, 935 (9th Cir. 1992); Willis
v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991); Lockhart v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc., No. 93-2418, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1201 (D. Kan. Jan. 25, 1994), Williams v.
Katten, Muchin & Zavis, No. 92-C5654, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13890 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30.
1993) (magistrate judge's report and recommendation); Scott v. Farm Family Life Ins. Co., 827
F. Supp. 76 (D. Mass. 1993); Hull v. NCR Corp., 826 F. Supp. 303, 304-06 (E.D. Mo. 1993);
DiCrisci v. Lyndon Guar. Bank of New York, 807 F. Supp. 947, 951-53 (W.D.N.Y. 1992);
Bender v. Smith Barney, Harris Upham & Co., 789 F. Supp. 155, 160 (D.NJ. 1992); King v.
First Boston Corp., No. 90 Civ. 4319, 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4745 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 8. 1992):
Sacks v. Richardson Greenshield Sees., Inc., 781 F. Supp. 1475, 1482-83 (E.D. Cal. 1991); see
also Scott v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., No. 89 Civ. 3749, 1992 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13749 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1992) (citing § 118); Bachus & Stratton, Inc. v. Mann, No.
92-1399, 1993 Fla. App. LEXIS 5484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. May 19, 1993); c Prudential Ins.
Co. v. Shammas, No. 1:93:CV:395, 1993 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15835 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 13, 1993)
(holding arbitrable claims of natural origin, religion, race, and gender discrimination in employ-
ment in violation of state law); Fletcher v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 81 N.Y.2d 623, cert. de.
nied, 114 S. Ct. 554 (1993) (holding arbitrable claims of racial and gender discrimination in
employment in violation of state law); Spellman v. Securities, Annuities and Ins. Servs., Inc., 10
Cal. Rptr. 2d 427 (1992) (holding arbitrable claims of racial discrimination in employment in
violation of state law).
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2. Congressional Misunderstanding and Misapplication of Alexander
Not only did Congress err by relegating treatment of the de novo
trial right to the legislative histories of the ADA and the 1991 Civil
Rights Act; the lawmakers compounded the error by supporting the
right with a seriously flawed rationale. Congress relied by analogy on
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.,248 failing to recognize that
Alexander's doctrinal underpinnings have no necessary application in
commercial arbitration.
Congressional misunderstanding threatens to produce an unduly
restrictive grant of the right to a post-arbitral judicial trial de novo. If
courts give effect to the committee reports accompanying the ADA and
the 1991 Civil Rights Act, the claimant's right would extend only to
claims under Title VII (the statutory right at issue in Alexander) and
the ADA (because of its adoption by reference of Title VII's remedial
provisions). 9 With this artificial restriction based on the strained an-
alogy to Alexander, Congress has placed itself in the awkward position
of suggesting an unseeming hierarchy among the four civil rights causes
touched by the acts.
Alexander arose from an arbitration pursuant to a collective-bargain-
ing agreement. The defendant company had discharged Alexander, a
black employee, from his trainee position as a drill operator. Contend-
ing that the discharge was racially motivated, Alexander requested his
union to pursue the collective-bargaining agreement's grievance and
arbitration procedure. The union complied, and the arbitrator found that
the company had discharged him for just cause.
Alexander then sued in federal district court under Title VII. The
Supreme Court unanimously held that the employee's right to a trial de
novo on his Title VII claims was not foreclosed by his prior submission
of the discrimination claim to final arbitration under the collective-bar-
gaining agreement's nondiscrimination clause.
The Court concluded that Alexander's "contractual right" to arbitra-
tion under the collective-bargaining agreement, and his individual "statu-
tory right" under Title VII, had "legally independent origins" '20 The
contractual right is "conferred on employees collectively to foster the
processes of bargaining and properly may be exercised or relinquished
by the union as collective-bargaining agent to obtain economic benefits
248. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). See supra text accompanying notes 170-76, 197-93.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 168-75, 188-204.
250. 415 U.S. at 52.
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for union members."' The statutory right "concerns not majoritarian
processes, but an individual's right to equal employment opportu-
nities. ' 52
An evident policy concern underlies the Court's legal distinction. In
an arbitration pursuant to a collective-bargaining agreement, the union
holds exclusive control over the manner and extent to which the
individual's grievance is presented. Only in the judicial proceeding
would the individual grievant conduct his or her own representation. In
light of what Chief Justice Warren E. Burger later described as "[tihe
long history of union discrimination against minorities and women," ''
Alexander appeared unwilling to assume that union representation in the
arbitral proceeding would necessarily permit vindication of Title VII
rights. Because "the interests of the individual employee may be subor-
dinated to the collective interests of all employees in the bargaining
unit," ' 4 Alexander concluded that "harmony of interest between the
union and the individual employee cannot always be presumed, espe-
cially where a claim of racial discrimination is made." 255 The union
would have a duty of fair representation in the arbitration, but the
Court stated that breach of the duty "may prove difficult to estab-
lish."2 6
251. Id.
252. Id. at 51.
253. Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 749-50 (1981) (Burger, CJ..
dissenting) (discussing Alexander). See also, Newman supra note 221, at 40-41 (discussing the
history's probable effect on Alexander).
254. 415 U.S. at 58 n.19.
255. Id.
256. Id. A union breaches the duty of fair representation when its conduct toward a member
of the collective-bargaining unit is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." Vaca v. Sipes,
386 U.S. 171, 190 (1967). Decisions demonstrating the standard's difficulties of proof include
(in addition to Vaca itself) Air Line Pilots Ass'n v. O'Neill, 499 U.S. 65, 67 (1991) (Vaca
standard applies to all union activity; union's actions are arbitrary only where, in light of the
factual and legal landscape at the time of the actions, the union's conduct is so far outside a
wide range of reasonableness as to be irrational) (citation omitted); United Steelworkers v.
Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372-74 (1990) (union's mere negligence, even in a collective-bargaining
agreement's enforcement, does not state claim for breach of the duty of fair representation;
because the union is allowed a wide range of reasonableness in determining the manner in
which it represents the collective-bargaining unit's members, the duty is a "purposefully limited
check" on union conduct).
The Vaca standard gives the union a considerable measure of discretion in determining
whether to process an individual grievance to arbitration, and then in conducting the representa-
tion before the arbitrator. See, e.g., 2 THE DEvELOPING LABOR LAW: THE BOARD, THE COURTS,
AND THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT 1442-64 (Patrick Hardin et al. eds., 3d ed., 1992).
The union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in a perfunctory
fashion, but the employee does not have an absolute right to have the grievance taken to arbi-
[Vol. 26:521
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Alexander determined that in the later judicial trial, a deferral rule
can best accommodate the federal policy favoring labor arbitration and
the federal policy against discriminatory employment practices. The trial
court would consider the employee's Title VII claims de novo, and the
arbitral decision "may be admitted as evidence and accorded such
weight as the court deems appropriate." According to the Court:
the weight to be accorded an arbitral decision... must be
determined in the court's discretion with regard to the facts and
circumstances of each case. Relevant factors include ... the
degree of procedural fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of
the record with respect to the issue of discrimination, and the
special competence of particular arbitrators. Where an arbitral
determination gives full consideration to an employee's Title
VII rights, a court may properly accord it great weight. This is
especially true where the issue is solely one of fact, specifically
addressed by the parties and decided by the arbitrator on the
basis of an adequate record. But courts should ever be mindful
that Congress, in enacting Title VII, thought it necessary to
provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of discrimi-
natory employment claims. It is the duty of courts to assure the
full availability of this forum"z 8
Commercial arbitration presents circumstances fundamentally differ-
ent from labor arbitration because the commercial claimant conducts his
or her own representation before the arbitrator. The claimant may assert
the individual statutory right in arbitration, free from concerns that may
attend union representation in the collective-bargaining context. In the
judicial trial de novo, then, the commercial claimant would have a
second opportunity to assert the individual statutory right, an outcome
presently having no policy basis other than blind deference to Alexan-
der. Congress must articulate an independent policy rationale for the
claimant's right to a judicial trial de novo following commercial arbi-
tration awards on claims under the statutes touched by the ADA and
the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
tration or processed to award without settlement between the union and the employer. See. eg..
Vaca, 386 U.S. at 191.
257. 415 ,US. at 60.
258. L at 60 n.21. See also Barrenine, 450 U.S. at 743 n.22 (realf-rming Alexander).
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B. Repairing the Damage
Congress should amend both the ADA and the Civil Rights Act of
1991 to add textual provisions guaranteeing the right to a post-arbitral
judicial trial de novo at the request of the party within the protected
class of any of the four statutes touched by the acts. The right would
extend to claims under any of the statutes. The scope of the de novo
trial right would be defined by the distinction between post-dispute and
predispute arbitration agreements.
Because post-dispute arbitration agreements are tantamount to pri-
vate settlements once the parties have had opportunity to assess the
strengths and weaknesses of their relative positions, 9 the right to a
trial de novo should not attach following awards in arbitration conduct-
ed pursuant to such agreements. Insofar as the legislative histories of
the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act suggest to the contrary,26
Congress should now explicitly reject the suggestions. When the pro-
tected party has the opportunity to assess his or her position in the
context of an existing dispute, the party may determine whether to ac-
cept the outcome of arbitration rather than pursue private settlement or
judicial relief. Despite imbalances of bargaining power that might exist
between the disputants, Congress should not grant the protected party
greater protection than the party would enjoy in the event of private
settlement. Because arbitration is designed to provide a decision based
on evidence adduced before a neutral decisionmaker, protected parties
fare no worse under post-dispute arbitration agreements than under such
settlements.
The right to a judicial trial de novo should attach, however, follow-
ing final award in FAA arbitrations conducted pursuant to predispute
arbitration agreements. Because of the fundamental distinctions between
the claimant's position in labor arbitration and commercial arbitra-
tion,2 6 however, Congress should reevaluate the Alexander analogy.
Congress should base the de novo trial right on recognition that
civil rights statutes hold a unique place in our jurisprudence as public
mandates to redress historic discrimination against particular classes or
groups of persons. As remedial legislation designed to produce equality
before the law, civil rights legislation is imbued with particularly strong
259. See supra text accompanying notes 206-12.
260. See supra text accompanying notes 168-76, 187-204.
261. See supra text accompanying note 258.
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protective purposes grounded in ideals fundamental to our polity. Be-
cause of these purposes, Congress may appropriately enact added mea-
sures to help insure that where arbitration is conducted outside the
settlement analogy (that is, pursuant to predispute agreement), resolution
of protected persons' statutory civil rights claims will be in accordance
with applicable law. The added measures are not grounded in concern
that arbitral procedure is necessarily unfair to persons within a statute's
protected class, or that arbitration is necessarily prone to awards at odds
with that law. Rather, the post-arbitral right to assert the statutory
civil rights claim in court helps ensure in particular cases that a public
forum remains available to help determine that the outcome is in accor-
dance with law as applied to the facts.
Because the member of the statute's protected class would enjoy a
second opportunity to advance the statutory right in the name of fidelity
to lawm question might be raised about whether Congress should
also grant the regulated person the right to a post-arbitral judicial trial
de novo. Courts then could play an even greater role by exercising
jurisdiction at the behest of whichever party was disappointed by the
award.
The de novo trial right, however, should not extend to regulated
persons. The right is a critical adjunct of statutes designed to remedy
historic discrimination suffered by particular classes or groups of per-
sons. Members of the protected class will normally be the weaker party
to the predispute arbitration agreement. Indeed, the predispute arbi-
tration agreement's enforcement serves the statutes' protective purposes
because this party frequently cannot easily meet the burdens and ex-
pense of litigation. If the regulated (or normally stronger) party
could invoke judicial jurisdiction following the arbitral award, that party
could frequently undo the protected party's arbitral victory based not on
the merits, but on the weaker party's inability to maintain the later liti-
gation. Because the regulated party will ordinarily be the one who pre-
sented the predispute arbitration agreement in the first instance, that
262. The measures, however, would meet concerns expressed by some commentators that the
relative informality of. alternative dispute resolution, including arbitration. may exposm women
and minority group members to enhanced risk of prejudice. See, eg.. Richard Dligdo et al,
Fairness and Fonnality: Minim.izing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution,
1985 Wis. L REV. 1359.
263. See supra text accompanying notes 248-58.
264. See supra text accompanying note 216.
265. See supra text accompanying note 221.
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party may fairly be held to the award, subject to the FAA's ordinary
grounds for judicial vacatur.'
Yet another concern might be raised. The de novo trial right would
expose the regulated party to the burden and expense of proceedings in
dual forums at the protected party's option. For two reasons, this expo-
sure may be cast consistent with the protective purposes of the statutes
touched by the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act.
First, to the extent the de novo trial right is otherwise appropriate,
the ultimate choice is between either denying the right or exposing the
regulated party to the prospect of dual proceedings. The burden is bet-
ter cast on the regulated party, not only because of civil rights
legislation's unique protective purposes, but also because the regulated
person will normally be the stronger party in the bargaining process. As
the stronger party, the regulated person will normally be the one who
created the prospect of dual forums by advancing the predispute arbitra-
tion agreement in the first instance.
Second, experience suggests that in most cases the burden of dual
proceedings would be more apparent than real. In the most pervasive
study of Alexander's effects on the courts, two researchers found that of
more than 1,700 labor arbitrations involving discrimination grievances,
only 17% produced filings for judicial trial de novo.2 67 Experience
thus indicates that despite the opportunity for judicial redress, arbitration
is the forum of last resort for the large percentage of Title VII claim-
ants who begin in that forum.268 One may expect that a similar result
would obtain with respect to commercial arbitration of claims under
Title VII and the other statutes touched by the ADA and the 1991 Civil
Rights Act. In some cases, arbitration may serve as an instructive expo-
sition of the relative strengths of the parties' positions. Where the
claimant loses in arbitration, the loss may diminish incentive to sue on
266. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1988), discussed supra note 227.
267. Michele Hoyman & Lamont E. Stallworth, The Arbitration of Discrimination Grievances
in the Aftermath of Gardner-Denver, ARB. J., Sept. 1984, at 49, 54-55; see also Elkouri &
Elkouri, supra note 1, at 14 n.92 (Supp. 1985-89) (discussing the Hoyman-Stallworth study).
268. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 221, at 222 ("the time, expense, and aggravation of a
court suit may in fact, if not in law, make arbitration the forum of last resort for many").
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the same facts.269 In other cases, the burdens and expense of litigation
may have eliminated judicial filing as a viable option at the outset.
Imposing the potential burden of dual proceedings might be coun-
ter-productive if the burden deterred regulated persons from continued
use of predispute arbitration agreements. Many protected persons would
lose the protection of such agreements and, in the absence of EEOC
action, would face the prospect of settlement or of trial conducted at
personal expense or under contingency-fee agreement. The relatively
low rate of post-arbitral judicial filings under Alexander, however, sug-
gests that a post-arbitral de novo trial right would not significantly
diminish use of predispute arbitration agreements. To the extent regulat-
ed persons favor predispute arbitration agreements as a cost-saving
measure, the desired result would be achieved in the significant percent-
age of cases.
As Congress reevaluates the Alexander analogy, it should discard
the cachet of Title VII that accompanied the decision's invocation in
the legislative histories of both the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights
Act.270 If courts give effect to the Acts' respective committee reports,
a claimant would hold the right to a post-arbitral judicial trial de novo
on claims under Title VII or the ADA, but not on claims under the
ADEA or the Civil Rights Act of 1866.2' By creating a wooden dis-
tinction based on Alexander, Congress thus has placed itself in the
awkward position of stating that some forms of discrimination warrant
269. Where the arbitration reveals particular weakness in the claimant's case., the claimant and
counsel may perceive the judicial proceeding as placing the defendant in position to recover
attorneys' fees. See, e.g., Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412. 421 (1978) (un-
der § 706(k) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. district court may award attorneys' fees to a
prevailing Title V'I defendant on a finding that the action was "frivolous, unreasonable, or
without foundation, even though not brought in subjective bad faith"); 42 U.S.C. § 12117
(Supp. IV 1992) (Title VII powers, remedies, and procedures am powers, remedies, and proce-
dures for enforcing ADA); Hoover v. Armco. Inc., 915 F.2d 355. 357 (8th Cir. 1990). cert.
denied, 499 U.S. 961 (1991) (ADEA does not provide for award of attorneys' fees to a prevail-
ing defendant, but district court may award such fees under the bad-faith exception to the
American Rule that each litigant pays its own attorneys' fees; under the exception, th trial
court may award attorneys' fees to a prevailing party when "the losing party has 'acted in bl.d
faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons'") (citations omitted): Cova v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 574 F.2d 958, 962 (8th Cir. 1978) (same); cf. Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5. 14
(1980) (per curiam) (applying 42 U.S.C. § 1988, which authorizes district court to award
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party in suits under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983. in suit under
§ 1983, held that district court should not award attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant ac-
cording a standard less stringent than the Christiansburg standard; the § 1983 action must be
"meritless in the sense that it is groundless or without foundation").
270. See supra text accompanying notes 168-76. 187-204.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 168-76. 187-204.
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greater public sanction than others, and that some classes or groups of
protected persons deserve greater protection than others. By distin-
guishing between claims under Title VII and those under the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, the 1991 Civil Rights Act's legislative history even
distinguishes between various forms of racial discrimination. Congress
should base the de novo trial right on the evil of discrimination rather
than on the circumstance that Alexander happened to concern Title VII
claims.
Congress, however, should maintain Alexander's deferral rule, which
strikes the appropriate balance in commercial arbitration. The rule
avoids two extremes, either of which would disserve the protective
purposes underlying the four statutes touched by the ADA and the 1991
Civil Rights Act. One extreme would deprive the trier of fact of all
authority to consider the arbitral proceeding's outcome. The other ex-
treme would authorize the court to give res judicata or collateral-estop-
pel effect to the arbitral award.
By depriving regulated parties of the right to introduce the arbitral
decision into evidence, the first extreme would grant claimants a greater
opportunity for judicial reversal after commercial arbitration than after
labor arbitration. Such a grant would ignore the circumstance that the
commercial claimant, but not the labor claimant, conducts his or her
individual representation before the arbitrator. Insofar as the commercial
claimant could render the arbitrator's exercise of judgment nugatory by
maintaining suit, this extreme would also run counter to Congress's
frequently articulated perception of arbitration as a mechanism marked
by fair procedure.2 This perception would suggest that Congress
should invest the trier with authority to give appropriate weight to the
award, which would ordinarily be based on the arbitrator's perceptions
of evidence similar to the evidence later adduced in court.273
At the other extreme, preclusion would also be inconsistent with the
protective purposes of the statutes touched by the ADA and the 1991
272. See supra notes 87-93 and accompanying text.
273. In trials following awards in arbitration pursuant to collective-bargaining agreements,
Alexander's deferral rule applies in jury trials and bench trials alike. Alexander announced the
rule in a bench trial on Title VII claims. See 415 U.S. at 60 & n.21. The Court reiterated the
rule in two later labor arbitration decisions. See McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S.
284, 292 n.13 (1984); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S. 728, 743 n.22
(1981). Barrentine was a bench trial of Fair Labor Labor Standards Act claims. See Barrentine
v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 615 F.2d 1194, 1196 (8th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 450 U.S. 728
(1981). McDonald was a jury trial of claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988). See 466 U.S. at
286.
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Civil Rights Act. 4 The judicial trial de novo is designed to help in-
sure that arbitral resolution of the statutory civil rights claims will be in
accordance with applicable law. Claim preclusion and issue preclusion
would undermine this purpose because the court applying preclusion
ordinarily examines the prior result without exercising independent
judgment about the correctness of the factual or legal determinations
that produced it 5
Alexander's deferral rule authorizes the flexible exercise of judg-
ment in post-arbitral actions brought before the courts. Many statutory
civil rights claims turn heavily on factual issues whose analysis under
settled law lies well within arbitrators' competence. Other statutory civil
rights claims turn on relatively straightforward application of less settled
legal principles, a task that may also lie within the competence of ex-
pert arbitrators. In either event, judicial participation in the resolution of
274. Cf. McDonald, 466 U.S. 284 (in action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a federal court should
not accord res judicata or collateral estoppel effect to an award in an arbitration pursuant to a
collective-bargaining agreement).
275. Under the claim preclusion doctrine, a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit bars a
second suit involving the same parties or their privies based on the same cause of action. See
Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S.
322, 326 n.5 (1979). Under claim preclusion rules, a valid and final arbitral award has the same
effects as a judicial judgment. See RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF JUDGME NS § 84 (1932). An
exception exists where, as in Alexander, a "scheme of remedies" permits relitigation of the
subject claim. See id. at § 84(2) & cmt. g (stating fact pattern similar to Alexander). The doc-
trine precludes a person from relitigating any claim or cause of action which was litigated, or
which could have been litigated, in the prior suit.
Under the issue preclusion doctrine, the second suit is on a different cause of action.
When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final
judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the determition precludes
relitigation of the issue. See Montana, 440 U.S. at 153; Parklane Hosiery Co., 439 US. at 326
1.5; RESTATENT (SECOND) OF JuDGMENTS § 27 (1982). Collateral estoppel rules may apply
following a final arbitral award. See id, § 84.
Following an arbitral award, application of claim preclusion generally presents Iess difficul-
ty than application of issue preclusion. Because arbitration ordinarily begins with a demand or
other written submission, the court may have relatively little difficulty determining whether a
particular claim or cause of action was litigated before the arbitrator, or whether it could have
been litigated. Because commercial arbitrators ordinarily do not write opinions explaining their
awards, however, the court may be unable to determine whether the arbitrator actually decided a
particular issue. Where this latter determination is evident from the award, courts invoke issuz
preclusion where the party suffering preclusion had full and fair opportunity to present its case
before the arbitrator. See, eg., Greenblatt v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, In., 763 F.2d 1352
(11th Cir. 1985).
Narrow exceptions to claim preclusion and issue preclusion, some of which involve the
court's exercise of independent judgment about the earlier result, appear in REsTATEMENr
(SECOND) OF JtnmmS § 26 (exceptions to the general rule concerning splitting). § 28 (ex-
ceptions to the general rule of issue preclusion) (1982).
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the civil rights claims may have minimal effect. Still other civil rights
claims, however, require thoughtful development of existing legal doc-
trine once the facts are determined; here the federal judiciary's ultimate
oversight remains particularly critical.
V. CONCLUSION
The ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act indicate a new direction
in the ongoing development of commercial arbitration law. Unfortunate-
ly, the Acts do not command respect for Congress's capacity to resolve
the thorny issues that attend arbitrability of claims under the four stat-
utes they touch. In the Acts' texts (the only sources assured of judicial
effectuation), the lawmakers provided for enforcement of arbitration-
agreements. Only the Acts' respective legislative histories acknowledge
qualifications on the binding effect arbitral awards would otherwise hold
under the FAA.
Congress should amend the ADA and the 1991 Civil Rights Act to
qualify the binding effect of arbitral awards by granting a right to a
post-arbitral trial de novo on claims under any of the four statutes
touched by the Acts. The right would extend only to members of the
statutes' protected classes, and would apply only where arbitration is
conducted pursuant to predispute agreement. The arbitral decision would
be admissible in evidence at trial, to be given such weight as the trier
of fact deems appropriate.
Congress should base the de novo trial right not on invocation of
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., but on the role of civil rights legis-
lation as public mandates designed to produce equality before the law.
The right should be guaranteed in the texts of the Acts so that congres-
sional intent may be effectuated without the uncertainties that invariably
attend case-by-case extrapolation of legislative history.
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